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 EUROPEAN BANKING UNION: ASSESSING ITS RISKS AND RESILIENCE 
 
NIAMH MOLONEY
*
 
 
Abstract 
On 4 November 2014 the EU’s ambitious Banking Union (BU) project reached a major 
milestone when the Single Supervisory Mechanism became operational. After difficult 
negotiations, the legal regime supporting the Single Resolution Mechanism is now in 
place; BU is becoming a reality. This article charts how the EU, long a regulator of the 
EU banking market, has grappled with the operational elements of banking system 
governance in constructing BU. It suggests that BU’s foundational regulatory technology 
is relatively robust, given the difficult political, institutional, and Treaty conditions which 
attended its construction; initial indications relating to the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism augur well. But the article also highlights the many uncertainties which 
attend BU, notably with respect to operational effectiveness, constitutional resilience, 
and the euro area/internal market asymmetry, and which may have far-reaching effects 
on EU banking market governance generally. 
 
 
Acronyms 
BRRD  Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
BU  Banking Union 
CRD IV/CRR Capital Requirements Directive IV/Capital Requirements Regulation 
EBA  European Banking Authority 
ECB  European Central Bank 
ESA  European Supervisory Authority 
ESFS  European System of Financial Supervision 
ESM  European Stability Mechanism 
NCA  National Competent Authority 
SRB  Single Resolution Board 
SRM  Single Resolution Mechanism 
SSM  Single Supervisory Mechanism 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
2014 has proved to be a year of epochal staging posts for EU financial regulation. On 
Tuesday 15 April 2014 - rapidly termed “Super Tuesday” - the European Parliament 
adopted a final suite of crisis-era reforms in its last plenary session before the 2009-2014 
parliamentary term closed.
1
 Super Tuesday can therefore be regarded as marking the 
                                                 
*
 Law Department, London School of Economics and Political Science. I am grateful to the referees of the 
Common Market Law Review for their helpful comments. 
1
 Including the 2014 Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive (Directive 2014/59, O.J. 2014, L 173/90), the 
2014 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (Directive 2014/65, O.J. 2014, L 173/349), the 2014 
Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (EU) 600/2014 (O.J. 2014, L 173/84), the 2014 Market Abuse 
Regulation and related Directive (Regulation (EU) 596/2014, O.J. 2014, L 173/1 and Directive 2014/57, 
 approximate end of the crisis-era reform period. Since early autumn 2008, when the EU 
financial system was gripped by the first of what would turn out to be a series of 
monumental crises, the EU has been engaged in a reform process of titanic proportions. 
This reform process has sought not only to achieve the massive repair required to the EU 
financial system, but also to stabilize the euro area - which came under existential threat 
as the financial crisis turned into a sovereign debt and euro-area crisis over 2010-2012.
2
 
Some 30 or so legislative measures which have transformed the nature of EU financial 
system regulation have been adopted and a vast array of non-legislative technical rules is 
in preparation.
3
 Like much of the crisis-era reform agenda, the Super Tuesday reforms are 
primarily regulatory in nature. They reflect the EU’s long engagement with rule 
harmonization in support of financial market liberalization, as well as the crisis-era 
commitment to a “single rule-book” for the EU financial system as a hedge against 
system instability.
4
 
But Banking Union (BU),
5
 the most radical of the crisis-era reforms, is not 
primarily regulatory. In a reshaping of the EU’s traditional harmonization-driven, 
                                                                                                                                                 
O.J. 2014, L 173/179) and the 2014 Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive (Directive 2014/49, O.J. 2014, L 
173/149). 
2
 For reviews of the reform process see, e.g. Howarth and Quaglia, “Banking Union as holy grail: 
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3
 For an initial review and attempt at quantification of risks and benefits see Commission, A reformed 
financial sector for Europe, COM(2014)279. 
4
 The term “single rule-book” has, in the wake of the financial crisis, come to act as something of a proxy 
for EU financial system regulation. But the nature of the “single rule-book” is somewhat elusive. It can 
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business.   
The term’s origins can be traced to the outbreak of the financial crisis and to the political commitment to 
more intense EU intervention. While the term “single rule-book” was somewhat loosely employed over the 
crisis reform period, it was characterized by the Commission as reflecting two goals - the more consistent 
application of EU legislation and, as far as possible, the removal of transposition risks - and as involving 
the construction of one harmonized set of core standards: Commission, 2009 European supervisory 
authorities proposals impact assessment (SEC(2009)1234), p. 8. 
5
 For initial analysis see e.g. Wolfers and Voland, “Level the playing field: The new supervision of credit 
institutions by the European Central Bank”, 51 CML Rev., 1463; Ferran, “European Banking Union: 
Imperfect, but it can work”, forthcoming in Busch and Ferrarini (Eds.), European Banking Union (OUP, 
2015) (and also <ssrn.com/abstract=2426247>); Avgouleas and Arner, “The Eurozone debt crisis and the 
European Banking Union: A cautionary tale of failure and reform”, University of Hong Kong, Faculty of 
law research paper No. 2013/037 (2013), available via <ssrn.com/abstract=2347937>; Ferran and Babis, 
“The European single supervisory mechanism”, 13 Journal of Corporate Law Studies (2013), 255; and 
Carmassi, di Noia and Micossi, “Banking Union: A federal model for the European Union with prompt 
corrective action”, CEPS policy brief No. 282, Sept. 2012. 
 liberalization-focused, and rules-based approach to financial system governance,
6
 BU is 
an executive and institutional reform.
7
 In a further reshaping of the EU’s approach to 
financial system governance, it is primarily - although not exclusively - directed to the 
euro area. As discussed in section 2 below, its origins lie in the need to break the toxic 
feedback loop which emerged over the crisis between fragility in the euro-area banking 
system and the sustainability of euro-area Member States’ fiscal positions and of the euro, 
following massive turbulence in the euro-area sovereign debt market and the emergence 
of “redenomination risk”.8 For the first time since the seminal 1966 Segré Report,9 
internal market construction and support have not been, at least directly, the dominant 
objectives of a major reform to EU financial system governance. 
At the core of BU are two structures. The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), 
in shorthand, brings the supervision of the euro area’s some 6,000 banks, directly and 
indirectly, under the control of the European Central Bank (ECB);
10
 it is concerned with 
bank supervision and with early intervention to prevent bank crises. The Single 
Resolution Mechanism (SRM), again in shorthand, brings the resolution
11
 of euro area 
banks, directly and indirectly, within the control of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) 
and puts in place a Single Resolution Fund to support resolution; it is concerned with 
bank recovery and resolution.
12
 BU reached its first major milestone on 4 November 
2014 when the SSM became operational. The SRM will become fully operational on 1 
January 2016.
13
 
Institutional reform is not new to EU financial system governance. But it has 
typically been a function of wider Treaty-based reforms to the legislative process which 
have facilitated the construction of structures which support delegated rule-making for 
                                                 
6
 The terms “governance” and specifically “banking governance” are used in this article to refer to the 
complex of rules, supervisory practices, and institutional arrangements which govern the financial 
system/banking market. This article is primarily concerned with institutional governance for the banking 
market which is designed to support operational supervision and resolution. 
7
 The Commission has recently described BU as providing the executive functions which ensure the 
common implementation of the single banking rule-book and the effective management of resolution: 
Commission, Banking Union: Restoring financial stability in the Eurozone, 15 Apr. 2014 (2014 
Commission BU Memo). 
8
 Or the risk of exit from the euro. 
9
 Report by a Group of experts appointed by the EEC Commission, The development of a European capital 
market (1966). The Report marks the EU’s first foray into financial system regulation. 
10
 Two legislative instruments support the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM): Council Regulation (EU)  
1024/2013, O.J. 2013, L 287/63, conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank (ECB) (2013 
ECB/SSM Regulation); and Regulation (EU) 1022/2013, O.J. 2013, L 287/5, revising the governance and 
powers of the European Banking Authority (EBA) to reflect the ECB/SSM (2013 EBA Regulation, revising 
the 2010 EBA Regulation (EU) 1093/2010, O.J. 2010, L 331/12). 
11
 Bank resolution relates to the process whereby usual insolvency procedures are bypassed given the acute 
economic sensitivities of bank failure. It typically provides for swingeing powers of intervention which can 
often lead to the suspension of creditor and shareholder rights and which are designed to either restructure a 
bank (including through e.g. the transfer of assets and the bail-in of creditors and shareholders) or support 
its orderly wind-down. See e.g. FSB, Key attributes of effective resolution regimes for financial institutions 
(2011), p. 3. 
12
 The SRM is based on Regulation (EU) 806/2014, O.J. 2014, L 225/1 (2014 SRM Regulation) and an 
Intergovernmental agreement on the single resolution fund (Council Document 8457/14). 
13
 The 2014 SRM Regulation provisions relating to cooperation between the SRB and national resolution 
authorities on the bank resolution plans required under the 2014 BRRD apply from 1 Jan. 2015, while the 
provisions relating to the establishment of the SRM applied from its entry into force in July 2014. 
 the EU financial system. The need for specialist technical rule-making for the internal 
financial market was, at least until the financial crisis, the driver of institutional reform. 
Institutional reform directed to executive supervisory governance - and primarily to the 
euro area - is a constitutional and political novelty. The first major institutional reforms to 
EU financial system governance were adopted under the 2001-2004 Lamfalussy reforms. 
The Lamfalussy reforms laid the foundations for a network-based institutional 
governance system for the supervision of the EU financial system as a whole and took the 
form of new EU committees composed of national regulators (“national competent 
authorities”, or NCAs).14 But their primary focus was regulatory and on supporting the 
Commission-led delegated rule-making process. While these committees were also 
designed to support supervisory co-ordination across the internal market, they were 
hampered by their status as soft law actors.
15
 The deeper institutional reform which 
followed over the crisis era (discussed in section 2 below) took the form initially of the 
January 2011 establishment of the internal-market-wide European System of Financial 
Supervision (ESFS). At the heart of the ESFS are the NCAs, the “anchor” supervisors of 
the EU financial system, responsible as “home” supervisors for the activities of 
domestically-registered actors, including with respect to most cross-border activity in 
“host” States. The ESFS is also composed of new EU actors which are designed to 
strengthen EU financial system governance: the European Systemic Risk Board;
16
 and 
the three sectoral European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs)
17
 – the European Banking 
Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, and the 
European Securities and Markets Authority, and their coordinating Joint Committee. But 
the transfer of executive supervisory power to the EU through the three ESAs, albeit 
precedent-setting,
18
 was limited (see section 2 below). Politically, the fiscal costs which 
the initial series of crisis-era bank rescues by Member States imposed on domestic tax-
payers
19
 shaped the profound resistance by some Member States
20
 to the transfer of 
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 The Committee of European Securities Regulators (established in 2001), the Committee of European 
banking supervisors (established in 2004), and the Committee of European insurance and occupational 
pensions supervisors (established in 2004). See e.g. de Visscher, Maisocq, and Varone, “The Lamfalussy 
reform in the EU securities markets: Fiduciary relationships, policy effectiveness, and the balance of 
power”, 28 Journal of Public Policy (2008), 19. 
15
 In that they were not (and could not be) empowered to adopt measures with binding effect. On the role of 
soft law institutional structures in financial system governance see Alexander and Ferran, “Can soft law 
bodies be effective? The special case of the European systemic risk board”, (2010) EL Rev., 751. 
16
 A soft law body, responsible for monitoring the macro-prudential (system-wide) stability of the EU 
financial system. See further Alexander and Ferran, ibid. 
17
 Which, as discussed further in this article, exercise an array of supervisory co-ordination/convergence 
powers and quasi-rule-making powers. 
18
 See further Everson, “A technology of expertise: EU financial services agencies”, 49 LSE "Europe in 
Question (LEQS) Working paper (2012); Schammo, “EU day to day supervision or intervention-based 
supervision: Which way forward for the European system of financial supervision”, 32 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies (2012), 171; and Moloney, “The European securities and markets authority and institutional 
design for the EU financial markets - A tale of two competences: Part (2) supervision”, 12 European 
Business Organization Law Review (2011), 177. 
19
 The public capital injected into EU banks over 2008-2012 is estimated to be in the region of €413.2 
billion, amounting to 3.2% of EU GDP in 2012: Commission, European financial stability and integration 
report 2013 (2014), SWD(2014)170, p. 74. 
20
 The main conflict line was between the UK (rigidly opposed to any transfer of powers with fiscal 
consequences) and often supported by Spain and the Czech Republic, and France, often supported by Italy, 
 executive powers with fiscal implications to the EU. Legally, the restrictions which apply 
to EU agencies under the Meroni doctrine limited the extent to which the European 
Supervisory Authorities could be empowered to take supervisory decisions (section 4.2 
below).
21
 But the subsequent catastrophic inter-twining of the fiscal health of certain 
euro-area Member States with the health of their banking systems, and the disastrous 
spillover effects for the euro area, led to the construction of the euro-area-orientated BU, 
the related transfer of significant executive control to the SSM and SRM, and to the 
clearing of political and legal obstacles previously thought insurmountable. While BU 
operates in a distinct constitutional, political, and market context, it accordingly provides 
another among the many examples of how financial crises have shaped financial system 
governance globally.
22
 
 Although the legal framework for the main elements of BU’s infrastructure has 
now been adopted, neither the euro-area or EU banking systems are stable. Summer 2014 
saw considerable market nervousness as to the outcomes of the ECB’s “Comprehensive 
Assessment” of the banks under its direct supervision from 4 November 2014,23 and as to 
the likelihood of bank rescues/recapitalizations on the foot of the stress tests and asset 
quality reviews which were at the heart of the Assessment.
24
 The EU banking system 
generally remains fragile. This fragility, repeatedly highlighted in the 2014 assessments 
of the EU financial system,
25
 was underlined by the July 2014 rescue of the major 
Portuguese bank Banco Espirito Santo. The wider EU regulatory system within which 
BU sits also remains somewhat unstable. The highly contested bank structural reforms - 
typically associated with the “ring-fencing” of more high-risk activities within banking 
groups and with the removal thereby of the implicit “too-big-to-fail” subsidy enjoyed by 
large, deposit-taking banking groups and associated in particular with deposit guarantees 
- have yet to be agreed by the EU.
26
 The shadow banking agenda, one of the last elements 
of the crisis-era agenda, remains incomplete.
27
 Major banking groups are also likely to be 
affected by the EU’s current alternative financing/growth agenda which seeks to break 
the EU’s longstanding and damaging dependence on bank-based loan finance and to 
strengthen capital-market-based and alternative sources of funding.
28
 The July 2014 
                                                                                                                                                 
Portugal, and the Netherlands: Spendzharova, “Is more 'Brussels' the solution? New European Union 
Member States’ preferences about the European financial architecture”, 50 JCMS (2012), 315. 
21
 Case 9/56, Meroni v. High Authority, [1957-1958] ECR 133. 
22
 Allen and Gale, Understanding Financial Crises (OUP, 2007). 
23
 Attention focused on e.g. the fate of the German State-owned regional Landesbanks and whether they 
would emerge from the Comprehensive assessment unscathed: Ross, “Bank balance”, Financial Times, 31 
July 2014, p. 9. See further section 4 infra on the Comprehensive assessment. 
24
 On 8 July 2014, the ECOFIN Council agreed on “terms of reference” for addressing any consequent 
capital shortfalls and related burden-sharing, and which were designed to highlight the centrality of private 
sector solutions, the need for supervisory early intervention where appropriate, and the exceptional nature 
of any public recapitalizations: ECOFIN Press Release, 8 July 2014. 
25
 The 2014 reports displayed some cautious optimism but also nervousness as to continuing fragility in the 
EU financial system. E.g. ESA Joint committee, Report on risks and vulnerabilities in the EU financial 
system (2014) (JC/2014/018) and ECB, Financial Integration in Europe (2014). 
26
 The structural reform proposal is at COM(2014)43 and reflects in part the earlier Liikanen Report, High-
level expert group on reforming the structure of the EU banking sector, Final report (2012). 
27
 For the main elements of the agenda see Commission, Communication on shadow banking - Addressing 
new sources of risk in the financial sector, COM(2013)614/3. 
28
 For a recent discussion see Commission, Communication on long term financing of the European 
economy, COM(2014)168. 
 support by newly-appointed Commission President Juncker of a “Capital Market Union” 
- the major elements of which are as yet unclear - signals that the EU has not lost its taste 
or ambition for major reform, even as the grinding imperative to stabilize the EU banking 
system recedes. 
 But the nature of the impact of BU is arguably the most significant of the many 
uncertainties currently assailing the EU banking market.
29
 The important August 2014 
review by the Commission of the ESFS, for example, suggests some nervousness as to 
how BU will shape the ESFS and as to its implications for the consistency and integrity 
of EU banking governance, given the split BU has opened up between the internal market 
and the euro area.
30
 This article accordingly seeks to chart how the EU, long a regulator 
of the EU banking market, has grappled with the executive and, in particular, the 
supervisory and rescue elements of banking governance, and the major risks which BU, 
particularly given its euro-area-orientated operating environment, may pose to the 
effective governance of the EU banking market. Section 2 considers the evolution of BU 
and its main elements. Section 3 considers the twin pillars of BU - the SSM and SRM - 
their main features and their major commonalities and divergences. Section 4 examines 
the main families of risk which BU generates, including with respect to operational 
resilience, robustness of compliance with Treaty requirements, and the integrity of the 
internal market. Section 5 briefly concludes. Overall, BU provides vivid evidence of the 
dynamism which characterizes institutional reform to EU financial system governance
31
 
but also of how that dynamism can place pressure on fundamental constitutional and 
political assumptions. 
 
 
2. What is Banking Union and where does it come from? 
 
2.1. Banking market governance and institutional design 
 
One of the sharpest lessons from the crisis era concerns the necessary extension of 
banking market governance beyond banking regulation. This is well reflected in the 
extensive supervisory review requirements for national competent authorities (NCAs) 
now specified in the behemoth 2013 Capital Requirements Directive IV/Capital 
Requirements Regulation (CRD IV/CRR).
32
 It addresses not only the harmonized rules 
governing bank capital, liquidity, leverage, risk management and governance, but also the 
related supervisory review process. The need for nimble, judgment-based and robust 
supervision of bank stability, both with respect to individual financial institutions (micro-
prudential supervision) and the financial system generally (macro-prudential supervision) 
                                                 
29
 For an examination of its likely impact see two recent discussions by Professor Ferran: Ferran, op. cit. 
supra note 5 and Ferran, “European banking union and the EU single financial market: More differentiated 
integration or disintegration”, University of Cambridge legal studies research paper series No. 29/2014, 
available at <ssrn.com/abstract=2426580>. 
30
 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the operation of the ESAs 
and the ESFS, COM(2014)509. 
31
 See e.g. Thatcher and Coen, “Reshaping European regulatory space: An evolutionary analysis”, 31 
Western European Politics (2009), 806. 
32
 Directive 2013/36, O.J. 2013, L 176/338 and Regulation (EU) 575/2013, O.J. 2013, L 176/1. 
 has become a mantra of the crisis-era reform agenda
33
 and a governing concern of the 
Financial Stability Board which co-ordinates bank regulation and supervision 
internationally.
34
 When, despite robust supervision, difficulties arise, effective, orderly, 
and speedy resolution for ailing banks which protects the tax-payer (including by means 
of burden-sharing across private creditors) is now recognized as essential to strong 
banking governance and to avoid the transmission of risk into the wider economy.
35
 
Institutional reform domestically in support of supervision and resolution has been 
significant,
36
 as have related reform efforts internationally with respect to global banks.
37
 
But effective institutional governance for the banking system is difficult to design. 
The lessons learned are often idiosyncratic and do not easily transfer across different 
market, political, and economic systems. Complex questions arise, including in relation 
to central banks as the lenders of last resort and guardians of money supply and 
transmission and their role in banking market governance.
38
 Institutional incentives can 
be difficult to align: the incentives of the various conduct, prudential, resolution, and 
monetary authorities which can be involved in bank supervision, for example, can all be 
different, and hard choices must be made as to when and which authority can trump the 
others. The difficulties become all the greater in a cross-border context, particularly 
where the need to allocate losses arises. The very strong transmission effects of bank 
weakness and failure into the real economy underline the limited scope for error. 
In the EU, it is axiomatic that the difficulties are all the greater. Prior to the 
financial crisis the EU had considerable experience with the design of banking regulation, 
albeit that EU banking regulation was primarily based on the Basel Committee rules 
relating to bank capital. But the EU’s approach to the supervisory governance of the 
cross-border pan-EU banking market was somewhat makeshift. With respect to the 
delivery of cross-border banking services from the “home” Member State bank through 
“host” Member State services channels and branches, it was primarily based on the 
allocation of distinct supervisory responsibilities to “home” and “host” NCAs; most 
supervisory control rested with the home NCA. An embryonic college of 
supervisors/consolidating supervisor regime applied to the supervision of cross-border 
banking groups which require “home”/”home” cross-subsidiary co-ordination between 
NCAs. Resolution did not form part of EU banking regulatory or supervisory governance. 
The policy debate was framed by the consensus-based “supervisory convergence” model 
which was in the ascendant pre crisis. A creature of the Lamfalussy reform period, it 
focused political and institutional energies on the enhancement of supervisory 
cooperation and co-ordination and on the convergence of best practices by the network-
                                                 
33
 E.g. Lo, “Regulatory reform in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-2008”, 1 Journal of Financial 
Economic Policy (2009), 4. 
34
 From among its many supervisory guidelines and reviews see e.g. FSB, Supervisory intensity and 
effectiveness. Progress report on enhanced supervision (2014). 
35
 E.g. Avgouleas and Goodhart, “A critical examination of bail-in and bank recapitalization mechanisms”, 
CEPR discussion paper No. 10065 (2014). 
36
 On the UK and US institutional reforms, e.g., see, respectively, Ferran “The Break up of the financial 
services authority”, 31 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2011), 455 and Skeel, The New Financial Deal. 
Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act and its (Unintended) Consequences (Wiley, 2011). 
37
 E.g. FSB, Recovery and resolution planning for systemically significant financial institutions. guidance 
on developing effective resolution strategies (2013). 
38
 Lastra, “The evolution of the European Central Bank”, (2012) Fordham International Law Journal, 
forthcoming (and available via <ssrn.com/abstract=2020545>). 
 based but legally fragile soft-law-orientated Lamfalussy-era Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors.
39
 
Notwithstanding the dynamism which attends EU financial system governance 
generally, any predictions pre-crisis of a more radical institutional reform to banking 
market governance risked charges of naïveté, even allowing for the pre-crisis 
intensification of banking activities and growth in the cross-border market.
40
 Particularly 
given relatively stable banking market conditions and the related absence of a crisis 
imperative, the legal pyrotechnics of any such centralization would have been spectacular 
(see further section 4.2 below). Similarly, the scale of the political effort which would 
have been required, particularly with respect to burden-sharing in relation to losses which 
could have reflected historic supervisory failures, would have been immense. In addition, 
national interests in financial system regulation and in related institutional governance 
were (and remain) acutely different in many Member States. This difference reflects the 
well-documented Liberal Market Economy (very broadly, market-based financing 
economies) and the Co-ordinated Market Economy (very broadly, bank-based financing 
economies) classification of Member State economies.
41
 National governance 
frameworks tend to reinforce these patterns of economic co-ordination, and Member 
States - deriving a comparative advantage from their institutional infrastructures and 
related economy types - can be expected to protect these institutions. While particularly 
acute with respect to financial market regulation, these interests have shaped domestic 
banking regulation and its development and supervision at EU level.
42
 Accordingly, while 
banking markets generally developed strongly across the EU prior to the financial crisis, 
they retained different features, differing with respect to, for example, their embrace of 
the “universal banking model” (associated in particular with continental banks), their 
reliance on market-based intermediation (in the form, for example, of securitization), and 
their structure: while France had (and has) a number of very large, systemic banks, the 
German banking sector was (and is) strongly characterized by small banks. There was, 
accordingly, little pressure for institutional reform at EU level. 
 
2.2. The origins of Banking Union 
 
2.2.1. The financial crisis, the internal market, and the European system of financial 
supervision 
The resetting change needed to drive the centralization of institutional governance came 
from the financial crisis which beset the EU financial system originally in autumn 2008.
43
 
                                                 
39
 The supervisory convergence model reached its apotheosis in the 2007 ECOFIN Conclusions on the 
Lamfalussy review which supported an enhanced supervisory convergence model as the best compromise 
solution for addressing banking market governance: 2836
th
 Council meeting, 4 Dec. 2007, ECOFIN press 
release No. 15698/07, pp. 13-21. 
40
 On growth in the EU banking market, see e.g. Hardie and Howarth, “Die Krise but not la crise? The 
financial crisis and the transformation of German and French banking systems”, 47 JCMS (2009), 1017. 
41
 The foundational work is Hall and Soskice (Eds.), Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations 
of Comparative Advantage (OUP, 2001). 
42
 See e.g. Quaglia, “The ‘old’ and ‘new’ politics of financial services regulation in the EU”, OSE paper 
series No. 2/2010 (2010). 
43
 On the early stages of the crisis in the EU see Begg, “Regulation and supervision of financial 
intermediaries in the EU: The aftermath of the financial crisis”, 47 JCMS (2009), 1106. 
 The pre-crisis EU banking regulatory regime and related organizational arrangements for 
supervision facilitated the cross-border activities of large banks across the internal 
market, but did not adequately (or at all) address cross-border supervision, co-ordination, 
recovery and resolution, and deposit protection.
44
 As the global contraction of liquidity in 
credit markets worsened in September 2008,
45
 money markets began to freeze, cutting off 
an essential source of bank liquidity. The EU financial system came to the brink of 
collapse as major banking groups, unable to source liquidity to meet their short-term 
liabilities, came close to failure. In the absence of a robust EU institutional governance 
structure for co-ordinating supervisory engagement and orderly bank resolution, and 
without a fiscal backstop, the initial chaotic stages of the crisis were strongly 
characterized by national support measures and related burden-carrying. Domestic 
interests, including domestic interests in protecting national banking systems by means of 
forbearance and the costly rescue of failing institutions, accordingly dominated.
46
 The 
scale of the Member State bail-outs led to the EU’s State aid rules, and in particular 
Article 107(3)(b) TFEU which allows for State aid which remedies a serious disturbance 
in the economy of a Member State, becoming one of the first of the mechanisms through 
which the EU began to develop a response to the crisis.
47
 Some six “Crisis 
Communications” were adopted setting out how Member States could take action to 
support financial stability while remaining in compliance with State aid requirements, 
and specifying the necessary remedies required of banks in receipt of State support.
48
 As 
the crisis deepened, the costs of bank rescue spiralled,
49
 ECB/Eurosystem support of bank 
liquidity intensified (at its peak, the total liquidity injected amounted to €1,700 billion – 
almost 20% of EU GDP
50
),
51
 the supply of credit contracted,
52
 pan-EU banking markets 
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 began to fragment, losing the level of integration which they had attained pre-crisis,
53
 and 
the scale of the costs to the real economy began to emerge.
54
 
In response to the myriad EU-specific regulatory and supervisory failures
55
 but 
also reflecting the international G20 reform agenda, the EU engaged in a massive 
regulatory reform programme to strengthen risk management by banks and to internalize 
within banks the costs of risk-taking. It also addressed institutional governance, recasting 
the pre-crisis supervisory architecture as the ESFS in order to strengthen consistent rule 
implementation, supervisory co-ordination, and crisis management. 
The ESFS institutional reform did not, however, radically reshape the 
organization of supervisory governance in the internal banking market. The NCAs 
remained the primary seat of supervisory power within the ESFS,
56
 albeit that they 
became subject to more sophisticated co-ordination requirements, including the group 
supervision requirements under the 2013 CRD IV/CRR. This expression of the 2009 De 
Larosière Report’s recommendation that the ESFS “be a largely decentralized structure” 
in which national authorities, closest to the markets and institutions supervised, would 
continue to carry out day to day supervision and preserve the majority of their 
competences,
57
 reflected not only the efficiency attractions of decentralization, but the 
very significant political, fiscal, operational, and legal complexities of more centralized 
supervision. For example, while EBA within the ESFS has extensive convergence and co-
ordination powers over the internal banking market - including with respect to the 
adoption of supervisory guidance, stress-testing, peer review, and participation in 
colleges of supervisors - it has only very limited direct, binding powers of intervention 
over NCAs and banks. These powers of intervention apply in unusual circumstances - 
with respect to breach of EU law, in relation to binding mediation between NCAs, and in 
emergency conditions - and allow EBA to, broadly, direct NCAs and banks to take 
specified action to ensure compliance with EU rules. EBA’s intervention powers are also 
tightly confined, reflecting the constitutional limitations on EBA as an EU agency, as 
discussed in section 4.2 below. These powers are also, and with respect to EBA action 
with respect to binding mediation and emergency conditions, subject to a Member State 
veto mechanism (managed through ECOFIN) where a Member State argues that an EBA 
action has fiscal implications. The parallel European Securities and Markets Authority, by 
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 contrast, was granted at the outset extensive, direct supervisory powers with respect to 
rating agencies. But as any supervisory failures in relation to, or action with respect to, 
rating agencies carry limited fiscal risk, the granting of these powers was more an 
indication of the Member States’ unwillingness to cede to the European Supervisory 
Authorities (ESAs) real supervisory power with the potential to impose fiscal burdens, 
than an indication of a commitment to centralizing supervisory power and to burden 
sharing at EU level. 
 
2.2.2. The euro area crisis and Banking Union 
The subsequent deepening of the financial crisis would sharply expose the limitations of 
the initial wave of reform and the need for an institutional structure to support common 
supervisory and resolution tools with fiscal heft. But this deepening of the crisis was 
driven by euro-area and not internal-market-wide risks The banking system and banking 
supervision are closely tied to fiscal and economic sustainability: when economies are 
strong, the implicit sovereign fiscal backstop to banks is also strong, but banks may grow 
to overwhelm the national economy and national supervision; when economies are weak, 
the fiscal backstop loses credibility, weakened banks can come under further pressure 
(including as large buyers of compromised sovereign debt), and may come to over-run 
the capacity of the economy to supervise and support the banking system.
58
 In the euro 
area, this scenario played out with disastrous consequences. The catastrophic costs of 
bank rescue by some Member States, and the destructive feedback loop which emerged 
between bank stability and sovereign risk (as the market lost faith in the ability of 
Member States encumbered by the costs of bank rescue to repay sovereign debt and as 
banks became further weakened
59
), transformed the EU financial crisis into a euro-area 
sovereign debt crisis. 
The oft-described “toxic” linkage between pressure on the public finances of 
some Member States (and on their sovereign debt markets), and the strength of domestic 
banking systems, generated from the outset a multi-layered EU-led if euro-area-
orientated response.
60
 A series of financial assistance programmes were put in place for 
certain Member States, including, in the later stages of the crisis, under the new European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM, discussed in section 2.3 below).
61
 As the crisis evolved, 
private sector burden-sharing by creditors (“bail-in”) increasingly formed part of 
financial assistance programmes, notably in the case of Greece in 2012 and Cyprus in 
2013. Far-reaching changes to the institutional settlement governing EMU were adopted: 
new rules governing budgetary co-ordination and discipline were put in place (ultimately 
through the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance which built on reforms to 
the Stability and Growth Pact), along with a new institutional structure to finance support 
programmes for euro-area Member States (the ESM, which replaced the earlier European 
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 Financial Stability Facility, EFSF).
62
 Historic and controversial support for the euro from 
the ECB also followed. At the outset of the sovereign debt crisis (in 2010) the ECB 
established its Securities Markets Programme under which the Eurosystem could 
intervene to support liquidity in public and private bond markets; intervention in the 
sovereign bond markets was strictly limited to the secondary markets, to meet the Article 
123 TFEU prohibition on “bail-outs” of Member States.63 
But in the absence of a euro-area commitment to a credible mutualized fiscal 
backstop to take the weight of bank rescue, and amidst concerns as to the depth of 
Member States’ budgetary reforms, euro-area sovereign debt markets remained unstable. 
Market expectations as to the likelihood of a potential Greek default on sovereign debt 
led to the closing of the Greek sovereign debt market and generated contagion risks for 
the euro area over 2010. Over summer 2011 the dysfunction spread from Greece to Italy 
and Spain, prompting massive Securities Market Programme intervention from the 
Eurosystem. The crisis deepened over autumn 2011, spreading to France, Belgium, and 
Austria, as new concerns emerged as to the strength of banks across the EU,
64
 as bank 
balance sheets became weakened by exposure to sovereign debt, and as the ability of 
“strained sovereigns” to provide a credible backstop was doubted by the markets.65 
The euro-area sovereign debt crisis was not brought under some degree of control 
until two related (although not coordinated) events. The calming of sovereign debt 
markets is now associated with the July 2012 ECB commitment to large-scale 
intervention in euro-area sovereign debt markets, which was followed by the related 
September 2012 establishment of the Outright Monetary Transactions programme. The 
programme permits the ECB to intervene, to an unlimited extent, in secondary sovereign 
bond markets, subject to strict conditionality and in order to address severe distortions in 
sovereign bond markets.
66
 The calming of markets is also associated with the 
commitment, earlier on 29 June 2012, by the European Council and euro group Member 
States to establish a centralized system of bank supervision and resolution (BU) which 
would provide the foundation for a credible euro-area fiscal backstop in the form of direct 
bank recapitalization by the ESM; this system would thereby break the death embrace 
between failing banks and sovereigns and the euro generally.
67
 The proximate cause for 
BU can be associated with the €100 billion rescue of Spain’s banking system announced 
in June 2012 which brought into sharp focus the need for a credible backstop, detached 
from the sovereign.
68
 From the outset, therefore, access to a credible fiscal backstop in 
the form of recapitalization by the ESM, which would break the link between sovereigns 
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 and banks, was a key driver of euro-area Member States’ agreement to BU. The 
Commission’s subsequent September 2012 “roadmap” expressed the 29 June 2012 
political commitment in the form of a reform agenda covering a single supervisory 
mechanism, a common system for deposit guarantees, and an integrated crisis 
management framework.
69
 
Notwithstanding that access to centralized fiscal support was the political raison 
d’être for BU, the severe legal and political difficulties entailed meant that the 
mutualization of bank losses and the (ultimately limited) pooling of fiscal support 
through the SRM were the last elements to be agreed. Attention first focused on the SSM. 
Over autumn 2012, and between European Council exhortations that BU progress,
70
 
Council negotiations on the “first step” Commission September 2012 SSM Proposal71 
proceeded. The SSM Proposal required unanimous adoption by the Council under the 
Article 127(6) TFEU competence and did not directly involve the Parliament, leading to 
significant Parliament concern as to its exclusion from the process.
72
 Nonetheless, the 
negotiations concluded relatively speedily in December 2012, following resolution of 
Council conflicts relating to, inter alia, the appropriate Treaty competence and the scope 
of the SSM (see section 4 below). The negotiations on the Commission’s July 2013 SRM 
Proposal,
73
 which engaged the Parliament given the (ultimately partial) reliance on 
Article 114 TFEU as the Treaty competence, proved infinitely more difficult as they 
required direct engagement with burden-sharing and loss mutualization. Negotiations 
within and between the Council and Parliament proved to be immensely complex, 
particularly with respect to SRM governance, loss mutualization, and the use of an 
Intergovernmental Agreement
74
 for aspects of the Single Resolution Fund (see section 4 
below).
75
 Agreement was not reached until the dying days of the 2009-2014 Parliament 
term in March 2014. As noted in section 2.3 below, the deposit guarantee regime 
highlighted in the Commission’s original roadmap as an element of BU does not, as 
adopted, have a mutualization or executive function and it is significantly less radical 
than the SSM and SRM elements of BU. 
 
2.3. The elements of Banking Union 
 
Although much attention has focused on the SSM and SRM, BU is composed of multiple 
interlinked components which have different Treaty bases and which operate in the 
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 internal market and the euro area to differing extents. An Intergovernmental Agreement 
(on certain of the Single Resolution Fund elements of the SRM), an intergovernmental 
Treaty (the ESM Treaty), a Commission communication (on State aid to the banking 
sector
76
), legislative measures adopted by the co-legislators, legislative measures adopted 
by the Council alone (the 2013 ECB/SSM Regulation), and a raft of euro group, 
ECOFIN, and European Council pronouncements and agreements can all be identified in 
the BU legal matrix, along with extensive non-legislative rules adopted by the 
Commission (under the 2013 CRD IV/CRR in particular) and the ECB (notably the ECB-
adopted 2014 SSM Framework Regulation
77
), and soft law adopted by EBA and the 
ECB, including in the form of different “supervisory manuals/handbooks”. 
The extent to which the autonomy and integrity of EU law can be assured in the 
future given this complex matrix remains unclear. It is not clear, for example, how the 
EU’s harmonized bank resolution regime, which is set out in the 2014 Bank Recovery 
and Resolution Directive (BRRD) for all EU banks, and which is reflected in the 2014 
SRM Regulation with respect to euro-area bank resolution by the SRM, will relate to the 
SRM’s Intergovernmental Agreement, adopted outside the EU’s law-making procedures. 
The Intergovernmental Agreement governs part of the Single Resolution Fund element of 
the SRM (as noted in section 3.2 below), but sits outside the EU harmonized regime. Its 
coverage is limited, being concerned with the transfer to and mutualization of bank 
contributions within the Single Resolution Fund. But it demands that the SRM regime be 
permanent in its essentials: the Fund is conditional on a legal regime equivalent to the 
2014 SRM Regulation applying.
78
 Does this requirement freeze the harmonized EU 
regime, including the 2014 BRRD on which the SRM Regulation is based, which was 
adopted under the “Community method” and which can be (and is being) extended and 
amplified by non-legislative rules adopted by the Commission in accordance with 
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU? How might the development, refinement, and refreshment 
of the EU regime - not least in response to changed market and political circumstances - 
be constrained by the Intergovernmental Agreement? The highly contested BRRD/SRM 
Regulation bail-in rules, in particular, might be regarded as unlikely candidates for 
permanence. Similarly, complex feedback loops might emerge between both regimes. 
The Intergovernmental Agreement is to be applied and interpreted in accordance with EU 
law, including the new resolution regime (Art. 2, Intergovernmental Agreement), but the 
nature of the interdependence between both regimes has to be tested. 
Similarly, the harmonized, internal-market-wide banking rules (or single banking 
rule-book
79
) which govern the pan-EU banking market are a precondition for BU, which 
is executive in nature, and provide the regulatory framework on which the executive 
elements of BU are based. Thus, the SSM operates within the 2013 CRD IV/CRR and the 
2014 Deposit Guarantee Directive and related non-legislative rules, while the SRM 
reflects the 2014 BRRD which sets out harmonized rules governing recovery and 
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 resolution. But it remains unclear how the integrity and autonomy of the harmonized 
regime can be protected from undue influence from the new euro-area BU structures. For 
example, the single banking rule-book is supported by the related amplifying soft 
measures developed by EBA, which raises the potential for complex euro-area 
ECB/internal-market EBA interactions, as noted in section 4.2.2 below, given the ECB’s 
rule-making and soft law powers.
80
 
The SSM and SRM are, however, at the core of BU, implementing for the euro 
area (although open to non-euro-area Member States on a voluntary basis) the single 
banking rule-book and, in the case of the SRM, providing a means for coordinated bank 
resolution. The initial, tentative inclusion of a common, executive deposit protection 
scheme in BU
81
 did not survive fierce resistance from Germany.
82
 EU intervention with 
respect to deposit protection remains primarily a function of internal-market-wide 
harmonized rules and does not have a euro-area executive quality. The 2014 Deposit 
Guarantee Directive has significantly strengthened the harmonized deposit guarantee 
regime, including by means of rules governing ex-ante funding requirements. It does not, 
however, mutualize deposit protection, although it does provide for voluntary mutual 
borrowing between schemes. 
The major driver of BU was, from the outset, the construction of a fiscal backstop 
which would signal to the markets the resilience of the EU’s (and in particular the euro 
area’s) capacity to address bank failure and the related breaking of the nexus between the 
fiscal positions of sovereigns and their banking systems.
83
 But BU has yet to include a 
credible euro-area fiscal backstop equipped to deal with a major systemic catastrophe,
84
 
as is evident from the precautionary summer 2014 Council statement on the hierarchy of 
backstop arrangements relating to the ECB’s Comprehensive Assessment.85 The 
executive functions provided by the SSM and SRM, along with the strong ex-ante risk 
management required of banks under the single banking rule-book, are designed to 
minimize the risks of disorderly bank failure and of related costs to the tax-payer and 
stability risks. But national support is still envisaged as a last resort
86
 and is subject to the 
Commission’s 2013 Banking Communication on State aid setting out the related 
requirements, including with respect to the imposition of losses on junior creditors.
87
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 The ESM casts a long shadow over BU, however, as the potential fiscal backstop 
for euro-area Member States, and thus a pillar of BU. The ESM, established under the 
intergovernmental ESM Treaty, with an authorized capital of €700 billion and a lending 
capacity of €500 billion, provides the Member States that are ESM members with a range 
of funding instruments, including loans, precautionary credit lines, and primary and 
secondary sovereign debt market support facilities. In the event that the SRM bail-in 
regime and Single Resolution Fund support do not adequately support bank resolution, 
direct bank recapitalization by the ESM will become possible (following the November 
2014 operation of the SSM)
88
 where the Member State in question is unable to provide 
support without very serious effects on its fiscal sustainability; onerous conditions will 
apply.
89
 The ESM is only available to euro-area Member States, however, although BU is 
open to other Member States. In addition, the relationship between the SRM (which 
applies to all participating Member States) and the ESM (euro area only) is not clear. The 
SRM, which is not empowered to recapitalize banks directly (Art. 67, 2014 SRM 
Regulation), does not yet have a fiscal backstop to its Single Resolution Fund in place,
90
 
although there are arrangements to allow the Fund to borrow (Arts. 72-73). The complex 
compartmentalization of national resolution funds under the SRM Intergovernmental 
Agreement and the staged mutualization process (section 3.2 below) underline the very 
significant national sensitivities, however, and also suggest that incrementalism is an 
unavoidable feature of backstop construction. 
 
2.4. The purpose of Banking Union 
 
This interlocking system is designed to “break the vicious circle” between banks and 
national finances by putting in place a common set of harmonized banking rules, 
providing for common implementation of these rules by the SSM and SRM, and 
supporting the more effective management of resolution; accordingly it should “put an 
end to the era of massive bailouts paid by taxpayers and help restore financial stability”.91 
In all, it is to increase financial stability while minimizing costs to tax-payers, complete 
EMU, restore confidence in the financial sector and reduce fragmentation, and ultimately 
contribute to economic recovery.
92
 
There is some support for these ambitious claims.
93
 BU has the capacity to 
remove, or at least significantly diminish, the recurrence of the banking market 
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 fragmentation which occurred over the crisis,
94
 perverse and anti-competitive national 
incentives to prop up failing institutions, deposit flight, and destructive feedback loops 
between euro-area sovereign debt and the banking system. It should also remove national 
distortions in the implementation and supervision of rules and mitigate the build-up of 
systemic risk.
95
 Were BU in place in 2008, it is doubtful that it would have prevented the 
crisis. But it may have weakened the bank/sovereign link. It may also, through SSM 
oversight and the reduction of perverse national supervisory incentives, have prevented 
the massive build-up of risk in some banking systems, such as those of Spain and 
Ireland.
96
 
The undoubted complexity of BU is not a reliable indicator of a predisposition to 
fail. Rather, it is an outcome of the unavoidable legal contortions and political 
compromises involved in a project of this scale, not least given Treaty restrictions, the 
novelty of mutualized fiscal support, and the difficulties caused by the euro area/internal 
market variable integration implied by BU. Accordingly, the very achievement of BU in 
its current form - and in particular, the degree of mutualization of losses achieved under 
the SRM, the cession of supervisory sovereignty under the SSM, and the development of 
legal technology to grapple with the complex euro area/internal market asymmetry - must 
be counted as an epochal success for the EU. There are, however, a series of risks to the 
effectiveness of this new institutional governance regime for the banking market which 
are outlined in the following sections, after a brief review of the two pillar institutions of 
BU, the SSM and the SRM. 
 
 
3. The Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism: Main 
features 
 
3.1. The Single Supervisory Mechanism 
 
From 4 November 2014, the supervision of euro-area banks takes place within the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM); the supervision of banks from non-euro-area Member 
States (the “pre-ins” and the “outs”97) will also take place within the SSM should such 
Member States join the SSM and so become, with euro-area Member States, 
“participating Member States”. The SSM is to ensure that EU policy on prudential 
supervision is implemented coherently and effectively, that relevant EU banking rules are 
applied in the same manner to all SSM-scope banks, and that those banks are subject to 
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 supervision of the highest quality, “unfettered by non-prudential considerations”.98 While 
strongly associated with supervision by the ECB, the SSM is a “mechanism” and not a 
single supervisory entity. The ECB is, however, at the core of the system; the ECB is to 
carry out its tasks within the SSM, composed of the ECB and NCAs, and is responsible 
for the effective and consistent functioning of the SSM (Art. 6(1), 2013 ECB/SSM 
Regulation). 
 The allocation of supervisory power under the SSM is specific and enumerated.
99
 
The SSM applies only to the prudential supervision of credit institutions,
100
 the nature of 
which supervision is specified in Article 4 (micro-prudential supervision) and Article 5 
(macro-prudential supervision). Other aspects of bank supervision, notably with respect 
to conduct risk and consumer protection, and other actors, regardless of their importance 
to pan-EU systemic stability, including central clearing counterparties, are excluded (Art. 
1), reflecting in part the terms of Article 127(6) TFEU on which the SSM is based (see 
further section 4.2 below). 
 Prudential supervision is allocated to the ECB and to NCAs within the SSM 
according to the Articles 4-6 division of competence. With respect to the banks which 
come within direct ECB micro-prudential supervision (as determined by Art. 6, outlined 
below), the ECB is exclusively competent for a series of enumerated tasks, carried out on 
a consolidated basis, including the authorization of credit institutions; acting as “home” 
NCA for credit institutions establishing a branch or providing services within a non-
participating Member State, and acting as “host” NCA for branches and services in 
participating Member States where the credit institution is established in a non-
participating Member State; assessing notifications of acquisitions and disposals of 
qualifying holdings; ensuring compliance with EU banking regulation (including with 
respect to prudential requirements related to own funds (capital), securitization, large 
exposures, liquidity, leverage and related reporting and with respect to governance and 
risk management requirements); carrying out supervisory reviews, including (in 
coordination with EBA) stress tests; and supervisory tasks relating to recovery plans and 
early intervention
101
 (Art. 4(1)). The ECB is also exclusively competent for the 
authorization and for the assessment of notifications of disposals and acquisitions for all 
SSM-scope banks (Art. 6(4)). 
  The allocation of banks subject to direct ECB supervision is governed by Article 
6(4) which uses a series of criteria linked to size, economic importance, and cross-border 
footprint. The ECB exercises exclusive supervisory competence over banks which are, at 
the highest level of consolidation, “significant” (by contrast with the “less significant” 
banks subject to NCA supervision) by reference to the total value of the bank’s assets 
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 exceeding €30 billion; or the ratio of its total assets over GDP of the participating 
Member State of establishment exceeding 20% (unless the total value of its assets is 
below €5 billion). ECB direct supervision also applies following notification by an NCA 
that it considers a bank to be of significant relevance to the domestic economy and the 
ECB confirming the bank’s significance, following a comprehensive assessment of the 
bank. The ECB may also, on its own initiative, consider a bank to be of relevant 
significance where the bank has established banking subsidiaries in more than one 
participating Member State and its cross-border assets or liabilities represent a significant 
part of its total assets or liabilities. In addition, banks in receipt of or requesting public 
financial assistance from the European Financial Stability Facility or the ESM are 
regarded as of relevant significance, as are the three most significant banks in each 
participating Member State (unless, in the latter case, their exclusion is justified by 
particular circumstances). The operational details of the classification system are set out 
in the 2014 SSM Framework Regulation. 120 banks and banking groups (representing 
some 85% of euro-area banking assets) came within ECB direct supervision on 4 
November 2014.
102
 
 The ECB also has general reserve macro-prudential powers under Article 5 which 
are tied to the capital buffers required as supervisory tools to counter pro-cyclicality risk 
under the 2013 CRD IV/CRR regime. Under Article 5(2) the ECB may - taking into 
account the specific situation of the financial system, economic situation, and economic 
cycle in individual Member States, if deemed necessary, and instead of the NCAs so 
doing - apply higher capital buffers for all banks than those applied by NCAs and apply 
more stringent measures aimed at addressing systemic or macro-prudential risks. In 
taking such action, the ECB must cooperate closely with the relevant authorities in the 
Member States concerned and in particular notify its intention to act – while the 
authorities concerned may object, they do not hold a veto (Art. 5(4)). Any NCA may also 
propose to the ECB that the ECB take action under Article 5(2) in order to address the 
specific situation of the financial system and the economy in its Member State (Art. 5(3)). 
 NCAs are the default bank supervisors with respect to tasks not allocated to the 
SSM (Art. 1) and specifically with respect to the Article 4 micro-prudential tasks for less 
significant banks (Art. 6(6)), save with respect to bank authorization and acquisitions and 
disposals. But the ECB’s position as general overseer of the SSM103 is secured through a 
number of devices which take the SSM some way from the network of supervisors more 
typically associated with EU financial system governance. For the purpose of carrying 
out its tasks, the ECB is to adopt guidelines, recommendations, and decisions and, 
additionally, regulations of general application (albeit the latter only to the extent 
necessary to organize or specify the arrangements for carrying out tasks conferred on it 
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 under the 2013 ECB/SSM Regulation
104
) (Art. 4(3)). With specific reference to NCA 
national supervision, the ECB is to adopt regulations, guidelines, or general instructions 
to NCAs, governing how the Article 4 supervisory tasks are performed and supervisory 
decisions adopted (Art. 6(5)). The ECB can also, in order to ensure the consistent 
application of high supervisory standards, on its own initiative and after consulting the 
NCA (or on an NCA request), take over supervision of a bank (Art. 6(5)). More generally, 
it can at any time make use of its distinct supervisory and enforcement powers under 
Articles 10-13 and can request information from NCAs on the performance of their 
allocated tasks (Art. 6(5)). Further tying NCAs to the ECB: where appropriate and 
without prejudice to the responsibility and accountability of the ECB, NCAs are 
responsible for assisting the ECB with the preparation and implementation of any of the 
ECB’s exclusive Article 4 tasks and must follow the ECB’s instructions when performing 
these tasks (Art. 6(3)). The modalities governing the NCA/ECB relationship are governed 
by the 2014 SSM Framework Regulation. Particular procedures apply with respect to 
participating Member States who are not euro-area Member States (section 4.2.2 below). 
 NCAs are the default location of macro-prudential power and, when appropriate 
or deemed required, are to apply capital buffer requirements to banks, in accordance with 
the CRD IV/CRR and including counter-cyclical capital buffers, and any other measures 
aimed at addressing systemic or macro-prudential risks; the ECB must, however, be 
notified in advance and is empowered to object although it does not hold a veto (Art. 
5(1)). 
  In exercising its powers, the ECB is to act with a view to contributing to the 
safety and soundness of banks and the stability of the financial system within the EU and 
each Member State, with full regard and duty of care for the unity and integrity of the 
financial market, based on equal treatment of banks with a view to preventing regulatory 
arbitrage (Art. 1(1)). It must apply the relevant harmonized banking regime (the single 
banking rule-book), in the form of all applicable EU law but with relevant national 
calibrations
105
 and of related non-legislative/delegated rules including Binding Technical 
Standards, as well as any guidance adopted by EBA and the EBA “Supervisory 
Handbook”106 (Art. 4(3)). The ECB has an extensive range of supervisory, investigatory, 
and enforcement powers to support supervision (Arts. 9-13, 16,
107
 and 18). 
The organizational governance of the ECB with respect to its SSM functions is 
designed to address, inter alia, the well-documented conflict of interest risk attendant on 
the ECB’s combining monetary and supervisory functions. Article 25 establishes the 
principle that monetary policy and supervisory functions must be separated.
108
 This 
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 principle is supported by the specific supervisory mandate given to the ECB under Article 
1
109
 and by the location of de facto decision-making power on SSM matters within the 
new ECB Supervisory Board (Art. 26).
110
 The Supervisory Board is responsible for the 
ECB’s supervisory functions and is composed of a Chair (proposed by the ECB,111 
approved by the Parliament, and appointed by the Council – excluding non-participating 
Member States);
112
 Vice Chair (proposed by the ECB from the ECB Executive Board, 
approved by the Parliament, and appointed by the Council);
113
 four ECB representatives 
(appointed by the ECB Governing Council);
114
 and one representative of the NCA in each 
participating Member State.
115
 The four ECB representatives must not perform functions 
directly related to the monetary functions of the ECB.
116
 This governance barrier is 
somewhat porous
117
 in that, reflecting Treaty constraints (section 4.2.1 below), the 
Supervisory Board may not adopt supervisory decisions - these must be adopted by the 
ECB Governing Council which is dominated by euro-area central bank governors. A 
silent assent procedure applies, however, under which a Supervisory Board decision is 
deemed adopted unless the Governing Council objects within a specified period (Art. 
26(8)). The barrier is also buttressed by the Mediation Panel which is designed to provide 
a mechanism to resolve differences by participating NCAs relating to an objection of the 
Governing Council to a Supervisory Board draft decision (Art. 25(5)). 
The ECB’s organizational governance has also been shaped by the complex 
interplay between the ECB’s Treaty-based independence guarantee (Arts. 130 and 282(3) 
TFEU), which can be regarded as applying to its new supervisory functions,
118
 and the 
SSM-specific independence requirement now imposed on it (Art. 19),
119
 and the 
potentially conflicting need for accountability controls which reflect its new supervisory 
functions. Although the mechanisms deployed to support ECB accountability while 
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 respecting ECB independence have evolved and strengthened over time,
120
 the Treaty 
independence guarantee might be regarded as generally exerting something of a chilling 
effect on the imposition on the ECB of robust accountability controls.
121
 The SSM, 
however, demanded something of a recalibration of the ECB accountability regime. 
Given the immense power which supervisors can wield over individual financial 
institutions and the financial system generally, while operational independence is 
essential for effective supervision it must be tempered by accountability controls which 
support legitimacy. The ECB’s new SSM-specific accountability regime is similar to the 
wider Treaty-based ECB accountability regime, being broadly based on institutional 
reporting devices, but it is more intrusive, reflecting the more acute need for 
accountability in the operational supervision context.
122
 The ECB is formally specified as 
being accountable to the European Parliament and Council with respect to the 
implementation of the 2013 ECB/SSM Regulation (Art. 20(1)). Related regular reporting 
and review requirements apply, and extend beyond the Parliament and Council to the 
euro group and Commission,
123
 while the European Court of Auditors is empowered to 
examine the ECB’s exercise of its supervisory functions when examining the operational 
efficiency of the ECB (Art. 20). Particular obligations apply with respect to the European 
Parliament,
124
 including with respect to the appointment and removal of Supervisory 
Board members, as noted above. Reporting obligations are also imposed with respect to 
national Parliaments of participating Member States (Art. 21). The ECB is in addition 
subject to a range of due process requirements, including the establishment of an 
Administrative Board of Review empowered to review ECB decisions addressed to 
natural or legal persons (Art. 24); ECB acts can be reviewed by the ECJ (Arts. 263-266 
TFEU). 
Whether or not this regime balances accountability and independence 
appropriately remains to be seen.
125
 Certainly, the effectiveness of the ECB’s wider 
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 accountability regime, particularly with respect to its monetary functions, has long been 
contested.
126
 With respect to SSM-specific accountability, the notion of “output 
legitimacy”, which relates the accountability and wider legitimacy of the ECB to the 
achievement of its objectives,
127
 may suggest there are grounds for optimism. The 
objectives imposed on the ECB in its SSM capacity,
128
 and the range of institutional 
reporting obligations to which the ECB is subject provide, at least, numerous channels 
through which its effectiveness in meeting its objectives can be challenged and made 
transparent. Initial indications from the Comprehensive Assessment certainly suggest an 
ECB concern to be transparent (section 4 below), and robust and forensic stakeholder 
attention (including from NCAs within the SSM) can be assumed. But whether or not 
operational independence and accountability will prove to have been sufficiently finely 
calibrated, particularly where difficult supervisory judgments become necessary, remains 
to be seen. It is difficult to dismiss entirely the charge that Parliament’s powers in 
particular - including its involvement in key Supervisory Board appointments and thus 
the internal governance of the ECB and its ability to demand ECB participation in 
hearings - represent a challenge to ECB independence, whether seen in terms of the 
Treaty guarantee or Article 19.
129
 On the other hand, ECB independence generally is not 
absolute and is designed to protect the ECB from political pressure.
130
 In addition, ECB 
“supervisory independence” can be regarded as being of a different order to the monetary 
independence which the ECB has fiercely defended and which has long framed the 
debate on ECB independence, given in particular the third party interests affected by 
ECB supervisory decisions. The more serious challenge to operational independence, 
however, may arise from within the ECB and the role of the Governing Council in 
“endorsing”, in effect, Supervisory Board decisions, given the potential at least for 
conflict. 
 
3.1.1. The Single Resolution Mechanism 
The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) will be fully operational from 1 January 2016, 
and is designed to provide an integrated decision-making structure for SRM-scope banks 
in distress. It is designed to be aligned with the supervision of such banks under the SSM 
and thereby to ensure consistency of approach in dealing with euro-area banks and to 
support competition in, and the integrity and functioning of, the single market more 
generally.
131
 Within the SRM, institutional incentives should be aligned to ensure the 
least-cost solution is achieved in relation to a bank in distress, while its centralized nature 
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 should generate economies of scale, reduce capture risks, and significantly mitigate the 
risk of forbearance.
132
 Within the parallel SSM, supervision should be enhanced, not least 
as the SRM allows the ECB to credibly raise the threat of resolution as a deterrent. More 
broadly, the SRM signals the resilience of the EU’s capacity to deal with bank failure. 
While the SRM cannot directly recapitalize banks, it forms part of the EU’s fiscal 
backstop regime by including within it a Single Resolution Fund (based on the internal-
market-wide 2014 BRRD national resolution funds) which supports orderly resolution. 
The SRM Regulation applies on a mandatory basis to all banks established in an 
SSM-participating Member State (Arts. 2 and 4, 2014 SRM Regulation).
133
 It has two 
elements: an EU agency - the Single Resolution Board (SRB); and a Single Resolution 
Fund. 
With respect to the SRB, in an uneasy compromise between the need for speedy, 
centralized decision-making and the political imperative for national representation given 
the fiscal consequences, the SRB operates in two sessions: the executive and plenary 
sessions. Typically, resolution will occur through the executive session (Art. 54). The 
executive session of the SRB - composed of a Chair, Vice Chair, four permanent 
members, the relevant national resolution authorities (NRAs) (of the institution in 
distress),
134
 and observer representatives from the ECB and the Commission
135
 - is 
responsible for drawing up the resolution plans, and adopting all resolution decisions, for 
cross-border banking groups and banks directly supervised by the ECB (Art. 7). In taking 
resolution decisions, the SRB in effect applies the Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive (BRRD) (thereby mirroring NRAs in Member States not participating in the 
SRM).
136
 The SRB (together with the Council and Commission who take part in the 
resolution process) is subject to relevant EU rules, related delegated rules, and guidelines 
issued by EBA (Art. 5). 
Like the SSM, the SRM is a mechanism. Accordingly, and reflecting the 
allocation of tasks within the SSM, the SRB is responsible for the resolution of banks 
directly supervised by the ECB (and all cross-border groups), while NRAs are 
responsible for all other banks, unless resolution requires recourse to the Single 
Resolution Fund, in which case the SRB is responsible regardless of the bank’s size. 
Member States may also request the SRB to exercise resolution powers over their banks 
(Art. 7). Like the ECB within the SSM, the SRB has a range of oversight powers over 
NRAs (Art. 31) and can issue specific instructions as well as general instructions and 
guidelines (Arts. 28 and 31). In particular, where necessary to ensure the consistent 
application of high resolution standards, it may issue warnings where it considers that an 
NRA decision does not comply with the SRM Regulation or the SRB’s general 
instructions, and at any time, after consultation with the NRA or on its request, exercise 
directly all resolution powers (Art. 7). 
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 The SRB decision-making process governing resolution is at the heart of the SRM 
(Art. 18).
137
 Although multiple supranational, national, and intergovernmental actors are 
involved, reflecting the difficult negotiations as well as Treaty constraints, strict time 
limits apply in order to ensure that highly sensitive resolution decisions are made in an 
orderly and speedy manner; the process is designed to ensure that a resolution scheme is 
adopted over a weekend while markets are closed. The ECB triggers the resolution 
process
138
 by notifying the SRB, the Commission, and the relevant NRAs of its 
assessment that a bank is failing or likely to fail; the SRB retains the power to trigger the 
resolution process where the ECB does not make such a notification. The SRB (in its 
executive session) is charged, in consultation with the relevant NRAs, with adopting a 
resolution scheme (using the tools identified in the SRM Regulation which map the 
BRRD tools), and with identifying whether the Single Resolution Fund is to be used, 
once the SRB determines that the conditions for resolution are met.
139
 “Immediately 
after” the adoption of the scheme, it must be transmitted by the SRB to the Commission. 
A number of time-constrained procedural routes follow designed to accommodate 
Council and Commission interests and their political and Treaty prerogatives, reflected in 
the central requirement that the scheme may enter into force only if no objection has been 
expressed by the Council or the Commission (which objections must be reasoned) within 
24 hours of its transmission by the SRB. 
Reflecting the Meroni doctrine (section 4.2.1 below), the Commission has 24 
hours from transmission of the scheme within which to assess the proposed resolution 
scheme and to either endorse it or make a reasoned objection with regard to the 
discretionary aspects of the scheme. Within a shorter 12 hour time-limit from 
transmission of the scheme, the Commission may propose to the Council that it object to 
the scheme on the grounds that resolution through the SRM is not in the public interest. It 
may also, again within 12 hours from transmission, propose to the Council that it approve 
or object to a material modification of the amount of the recourse to the Fund provided 
for in the resolution scheme (the Council must act on the modification within 24 hours of 
the scheme’s original transmission). 
If the Council objects to the scheme on public interest grounds, the bank is wound 
up in accordance with applicable national law. With respect to Fund modifications or 
Commission objections to discretionary elements, the SRB must, within 8 hours, modify 
the scheme in accordance with the reasons expressed. Accordingly, where 
objections/modifications are raised, the process is designed to complete in 32 hours 
although it may complete in 24 hours where none are raised. Where the resolution plan 
involves the granting of State or Single Resolution Fund aid, the scheme may not be 
adopted until the Commission has approved the aid (Art. 19). 
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 The cumbersome (and more intergovernmentally-oriented) larger plenary session 
of the SRB, which is composed of the executive session members as well as all NRAs 
participating in the SRM, has a limited range of functions in the interests of decision-
making efficiency (Art. 50), but, in particular, is charged with the resolution process 
where recourse to the Single Resolution Fund in excess of €5 billion is required. In such a 
case, the scheme prepared by the executive session is deemed adopted unless, within 
three hours of the submission of the draft scheme by the executive session to the plenary 
session, at least one member of the plenary session calls a meeting of the plenary session; 
where this occurs, the decision is taken by the plenary session. The plenary session is also 
charged with adopting resolution guidelines for the executive session to follow where 
recourse to the Single Resolution Fund amounts to more than €5 billion over a rolling 12 
month period.
140
 
Once adopted, the resolution scheme is implemented by the NRAs, in accordance 
with national company and insolvency law (Art. 29). Implementation is monitored by the 
SRB (Art. 28) which may directly address orders to the bank in distress where the NRA 
does not comply with the resolution plan (Art. 29). 
The second component of the SRM is the Single Resolution Fund which is 
administered by the SRB and which has a target funding level of 1 per cent of the covered 
deposits of banks in SSM-participating Member States (€55 billion), to be reached over 
eight years, and which is based on bank contributions. It is designed to provide medium-
term funding support to resolution - mirroring the BRRD-required national resolution 
funds in non-participating Member States - in order to enable a bank to continue 
operating while it is restructured. The Fund may borrow, but the modalities and its 
relationship with the ESM have yet to be decided, as noted in section 2.3 above. The 
constitution and regulation of the Fund are regulated in part by the SRM Regulation 
(Arts. 67-79) and in part by an Intergovernmental Agreement. The latter addresses, inter 
alia, the transfer of contributions from national resolution authorities to, initially, national 
compartments within the Fund, the gradual mutualization of contributions (over 8 years) 
(60% of resources must be mutualized by year 2, and at a rate of 6.7% in each of the 
remaining 6 years), the order in which funds are allocated to cover resolution costs (the 
“waterfall”), temporary lending between national compartments, and the dependence of 
the Fund on the legal regime established under the SRM Regulation, including the bail-in 
rules, applying. 
As noted in section 3.3 below, much of the operational regime governing the SRB 
is very similar to that which applies to the ECB within the SSM, including with respect to 
accountability, enforcement, and governing general principles. 
 
3.1.2. The Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism: 
Commonalities and divergence 
The SSM and SRM were each forged in the crucible of the euro-area sovereign debt crisis 
and both formed part of the initial June 2012 European Council/euro group commitment 
to BU. But they have distinct institutional designs, different purposes, and carried (and 
still carry) different constitutional and political risks during their development. They also 
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 developed at different stages, with the SRM benefiting from the toolkit which was 
developed over the SSM negotiations. 
At first glance, however, the SSM and SRM have much in common. At the most 
basic, they represent a new form of governance for the EU financial system, with the 
ECB and SRB exercising operational, discretionary, and fiscally significant powers. In 
the case of the SRB within the SRM, these powers must be regarded as de facto powers, 
given the power of the Commission and Council to intervene and the Meroni constraint; 
nonetheless, the SRB’s de facto powers remain considerable. Certainly, the powers of the 
ECB within the SSM and of the SRB within the SRM far eclipse those of the European 
Supervisory Authorities. But while the SSM and SRM each centralize executive functions 
through structures which display strong supranational characteristics, they also display 
strong intergovernmental features and network dynamics. Accordingly, in both cases, 
national authorities retain default operational control, albeit that action by NRAs under 
the SRM, and by NCAs under the SSM, takes place within a legal infrastructure which 
privileges the position of the SRB within the SRM, and of the ECB within the SSM, and 
which grants each institution the power to direct and ultimately take control from NRAs 
and NCAs, respectively. Similarly, the SRB and ECB operate within defined operational 
environments. The ECB must operate within the EU regime governing operational 
supervision (based in particular on CRD IV/CRR and EBA’s evolving “Single 
Supervisory Handbook”), while the SRB can only take the resolution actions specified in 
the SRM Regulation. Both institutions are also constrained by their respective 
governance arrangements
141
 which reflect their distinct constitutional contexts. 
Ultimately, however, the loss of control by the Member States and NRAs/NCAs is real. 
The SSM and SRM also deploy similar legal technology. The SRB, for example, 
is subject to similar general principles as apply to the ECB under the SSM (Art. 6, 2014 
SRM Regulation and Art. 1, 2013 ECB/SSM Regulation), including with respect to non-
discrimination across the internal market. It is also granted similar investigatory and 
enforcement powers, albeit that these are prescribed by means of a legislative instrument 
under the SRM Regulation, and by means of legislation and also delegated rules under 
the SSM (Arts. 34-41, SRM Regulation; and Arts. 9-12, ECB/SSM Regulation and Arts. 
120-146 2014 SSM Framework Regulation). Their accountability regimes, to take 
another example, are also similar albeit with some nuances. The SRB, unlike the ECB, is 
accountable to the Commission, as well as to the Council and European Parliament (Art. 
45, SRM Regulation and Art. 20, ECB/SSM Regulation), reflecting the Meroni doctrine. 
Both SRM and SSM regimes also operate within defined jurisdictional and institutional 
parameters, applying on a mandatory basis to euro-area Member States although open to 
non-euro-area Member States, and to a (broadly) similar set of identified financial 
institutions, primarily banks. As such, they both represent a form of variable integration 
associated - albeit not entirely - with the euro area. 
 But there is much that is different. Functionally, the SRB will be much smaller 
than the ECB
142
 and has stronger “mechanism” features, relying on NRAs to a great 
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 extent: all resolution schemes once agreed are implemented by NRAs, although the SRB 
may intervene and direct banks in cases of NRA failure. The SRB also has a different 
institutional design to the ECB. The ECB, a Treaty institution, operates within a very 
different constitutional context than does the SRB, an EU agency. While, as discussed in 
section 4.2.1 below, neither constitutional context is free of legal risk, the SRB’s design 
reflects the particular constraints of the agency model. The ECB has, for example, 
distinct rule-making powers (Art. 4(3), 2013 ECB/SSM Regulation and Art. 132 TFEU), 
which, inter alia, allowed for its investigatory and enforcement powers, and its 
operational framework, to be governed in part through secondary ECB rules.
143
 By 
contrast, the SRB cannot adopt rules and its operational powers are delineated under the 
SRM Regulation. Similarly, as an EU agency, the SRB has a distinct and limited purpose 
and operates within an operationally-constrained framework. The 2014 SRM Regulation 
contains great detail (reflecting the 2014 BRRD) on, for example, the different resolution 
tools (including sales of businesses, bridge banks, and asset separations) and resolution 
processes (such as valuations and write-downs). SRB resolution plans are also subject to 
Commission endorsement and a Council appeal process. The ECB, by contrast, which 
deals with the entire bank supervision lifecycle, from authorization, through steady-state 
supervision, through recovery and resolution planning, through early intervention, and to 
the initial declaration that a bank is in danger of failing, can exercise a very wide range of 
prudential supervisory powers within the broad parameters established by ECB/SSM 
Regulation Articles 4 and 5 and relevant EU banking rules. Its supervisory discretion is 
very considerable - as is clear from Article 16 of the ECB/SSM Regulation (on 
supervisory powers), the wide-ranging powers it can exercise under the CRD IV/CRR-
required “Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process”, and its evolving supervisory 
methodology.
144
 
Elsewhere, however, the SRM might be regarded as the more radical innovation. 
In particular, the mutualization of losses through the Single Resolution Fund is an historic 
development. The fiscal implications of SRB decisions have also required distinct 
institutional innovations, particularly in the form of the direct involvement of the Council 
in the SRB; hitherto, the Council has not played a direct operational role in EU financial 
system governance. The involvement of the Council (and Commission) in the SRM has 
also led to some operational novelties. Both the Council and Commission, for example, 
must “make every effort” to comply with EBA’s resolution guidance (Art. 5, 2014 SRM 
Regulation). Although Article 5 allows the possibility of non-compliance, the implied 
subjection of two Treaty institutions to EBA soft law raises institutional balance 
conundrums of an even greater order than those raised by the subjection of the ECB to 
EBA’s intervention powers (as noted in section 4.2 below). 
 
 
4. A significant political achievement, but is it resilient? 
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4.1. Operational risks 
 
4.1.1. “Mechanism” risks 
The SSM and SRM elements of BU can easily be criticized given their myriad 
weaknesses and complexities, their legal risks, and their inherent instability as 
“mechanisms” which rely on coordination between central (ECB/SRB) and national 
(NCA/NRA) elements. The difficulties which the first three years or so of the ESFS have 
exposed in relation to the challenges which the European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs), albeit significantly weaker institutions, can face in directing NCAs to act,
145
 
whether with respect to, for example, binding mediation between national supervisors 
(section 4.2.2 below) or with respect to compliance with ESA guidelines,
146
 illustrate the 
inherent difficulties with network governance. But the EU was not provided with a “clean 
slate” in designing the SSM and SRM, and there are grounds for optimism. This section 
seeks to outline the major risks which can be identified, whether these are less sharp than 
might appear, and how these risks might be mitigated. Given that the SRM is not yet 
operational, much of this discussion focuses on the SSM. 
With respect to the SSM and SRM as mechanisms, classification risks arise. The 
SSM and SRM might be regarded as vulnerable given the split of competence between 
centralized and decentralized elements in both mechanisms, based on the SSM 
classification model (albeit with some calibrations in the case of the SRM). But political 
considerations aside, the avoidance of such a split by the movement of direct supervision 
for all 6,000 euro-area banks to the ECB was always impracticable on operational 
efficiency grounds. The need to protect the ECB’s reputation as a nascent supervisor147 
and to preserve national intelligence and experience
148
 as well as some degree of 
challenge within the SSM was also compelling. A similar logic applies to the SRM, as 
does the need to preserve coherence between the structure of both mechanisms given 
their interdependence. The use of “significance” as a proxy for those banks most suitable 
for supranational oversight and to manage the centralized and decentralized allocation of 
power also has a compelling logic. But as the financial crisis underlines, it is difficult to 
design proxies for market significance, particularly as small institutions can turn out to 
have systemic implications given their particular operating environments; it is all the 
more so where the proxies can be shaped by political interests rather than disinterested 
assessments of optimal scope.
149
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 The SSM negotiations struggled with how to define its operational scope. Germany sought to exclude 
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Wiesmann and Barker, “Germany’s small banks fight shake-up”, Financial Times, 3 Dec. 2012, p. 6); 
France favoured greater ECB control. The ECB made its support of a wide jurisdiction over all euro-area 
banks clear (2012 ECB Opinion, cited supra note 93, para 1.5). 
 The initial SSM experience, however, suggests some grounds for optimism. The 
multi-level 2013 ECB/SSM Regulation (Art. 6(4)) classification system, which uses a 
number of proxies for significance and so hedges against the risk of poor regulatory 
design, and which also allows the ECB where necessary to take over supervision of any 
bank (Art. 6(5)),
150
 is extensively amplified by the 2014 SSM Framework Regulation 
(Arts. 39-72). The detailed amplification provides some mitigation against the risk of an 
over-reaching ECB and of related tensions within the SSM, while some degree of 
flexibility is provided for by the classification review process (Art. 43, 2014 SSM 
Framework Regulation).
151
 The review process is based on close cooperation between 
NCAs and the ECB, so although there is some potential for turf wars, particularly as the 
scale of ECB influence becomes clear over time, a governing process is in place. The first 
classification by the ECB, among the first of the major tests of its effectiveness, can be 
regarded as procedurally successful.
152
 Initial decisions were made by the Supervisory 
Board in May 2014, consultations with the relevant “significant” institutions followed 
(and included the right to be heard on the classification decision), and final notification 
was made on 4 September 2014, in accordance with the 2014 SSM Framework 
Regulation procedures. Of the 120 significant banks, 97 met the size criteria, 13 the 
criteria relating to importance to the economy, three the criteria relating to cross-border 
activities, and 7 the criteria relating to the three most significant banks in a participating 
Member State. Notably, the ECB has exercised its discretion not to supervise (in 
accordance with Arts. 70-72 of the 2014 SSM Framework Regulation) with respect to 
three banks which met the criteria, on grounds which suggest some sensitivity to national 
supervisory efficiency.
153
 The ECB has also navigated the disconnection between its 
assessment of significance and the earlier-in-time requirement to commence the 
Comprehensive Assessment. In practice, all 120 institutions formed part of the 
Comprehensive Assessment apart from four (who subsequently became classified as 
significant on their cross-border activities).
154
 
Co-ordination risks also arise from the mechanism-based operating model. The 
acute dependence of both the SSM and SRM on strong co-ordination between the 
ECB/NCA and SRB/NRA elements of the mechanisms generates significant delegation 
risk.
155
 With respect to the SSM, seamless coordination is needed to ensure the consistent 
NCA supervision of less significant banks as well as effective ECB supervision, informed 
by local intelligence, of significant banks. The inherent network instability in the SSM is 
aggravated by the limitation of the ECB’s powers to enumerated Article 4 and 5 tasks. It 
is not inconceivable, for example, that the supervisory “grey zone” - the contested 
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 territory where domestic bank conduct supervision (strongly associated with market 
intermediation activities and often carried out in a distinct conduct/markets supervisor) 
and ECB/SSM prudential supervision intersect with respect to risk and stability 
supervision - will become a proxy battleground for more deep-rooted ECB and NCA 
conflicts. Article 3(1) of the 2013 ECB SSM Regulation provides for the ECB to 
cooperate with NCAs responsible for markets in financial instruments and related 
Memoranda of Understanding are required, but the potential for conflict is real.
156
 This is 
all the more so, as EBA has characterized conduct risk as a risk to a bank’s stability and 
has included it within its 2014 proposed Guidelines on the application by NCAs (and 
thereby the ECB) of the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process required of 
supervisors for banks under the CRD IV/CRR.
157
 But the ECB is legally constrained from 
engaging with market- (and consumer-) based conduct risk, given its strict Articles 1 and 
4 operational mandate. Ultimately, the treatment of conduct risk, a core risk to banks, is 
not clearly delineated. 
The operating framework for the SSM should at least mitigate the co-ordination 
risks.
158
 Under the 2013 ECB/SRM Regulation, extensive cooperation requirements 
apply (Art. 6(1)-(3)), the ECB has a range of rule-making and quasi-rule-making tools 
(Arts. 4(3) and 6(5)), and, ultimately, NCAs must follow ECB directions. Positive 
spillover effects for the ECB/NCA relationship as regards less significant banks may 
follow from ECB supervision of significant banks. For example, provision has been made 
for a procedural framework governing when and how NCAs can be asked to provide draft 
supervisory decisions in relation to matters for which the ECB is competent in relation to 
significant banks, allowing NCAs to support but also shape ECB decision-making more 
generally (Art. 6(7)). The 2014 SSM Framework Regulation amplifies the Article 6 
cooperation framework by means of general principles (Arts. 19-24) and operational 
requirements (Arts. 96-100), which address in particular NCA reporting obligations in 
relation to material supervisory decisions taken by NCAs concerning less significant 
institutions (Arts. 97-98). The ECB’s “SSM Supervisory Manual” (noted below) should 
serve as “operational glue” for the SSM. More generally, the delineation of the ECB’s 
powers (Arts. 1 and 4) and the underlining of the NCAs as the default supervisors in 
relation to non-enumerated matters (Art. 1) serves as something of a buffer against ECB 
mission-creep, even if it also creates a potentially contestable “grey zone”, as noted 
above. In addition, the ECB, as a nascent supervisor with no direct operational 
experience, has strong reputational and other incentives to ensure a good relationship 
with NCAs, not least as its ability to supervise significant banks depends in part on good 
communication lines with domestic NCAs. Other more specific incentives arise. For 
example, while the ECB is responsible for the initial authorization of all banks and of 
subsequent material acquisitions and disposals, Articles 14 and 15 make the relevant 
NCA responsible for data collection and assessment of compliance with relevant 
conditions; the ECB in effect endorses the NCA decision but is the de jure authorizing 
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 actor, albeit with limited operational control. Good ECB/NCA working relationships will 
accordingly be operationally critical. But while the legal supports for SSM co-ordination 
seem relatively robust, much depends on the effectiveness of day-to-day ECB/NCA 
relations. Here the initial signs are good. The 2014 ECB SSM readiness reports, for 
example, all recount ever-increasing contacts between the ECB and NCAs. In an 
innovative development, “Joint Supervisory Teams” have been put in place for significant 
banks, headed by an ECB coordinator and comprising NCA and ECB supervisors, and 
are tailored to the particular business model, risk profile, and geographic distribution of 
the bank in question.
159
 
Although operational experience is yet to come, the 2014 SRM Regulation 
similarly delineates the respective powers of the SRB and NRAs (Art. 7), establishes a 
cooperation mechanism (e.g. Arts. 6 and 30-31), specifies the conditions under which 
NRAs must implement resolution plans and provides for SRB monitoring (Arts. 28-29), 
and provides for SRB intervention where an NRA fails to follow the SRB resolution plan 
(Art. 29). The need for effective cooperation is particularly acute for the SRB, however, 
as it does not, save in very unusual circumstances, take direct operational action but 
depends on NRAs. 
 
4.1.2. The ECB as supervisor 
One of the earliest concerns relating to the SSM was whether the ECB, as an independent 
monetary authority and fiercely protective of its Treaty-conferred independence,
160
 would 
be able to engage effectively in the messy, politically-sensitive, and risky business of 
direct operational supervision.
161
 While it is too early to make a confident prediction of 
success, initial signs augur well. 
The quarterly reports prepared on SSM readiness across 2014 suggest a 
considerable degree of initial operational effectiveness. In particular, the ECB’s 
supervisory procedures are developing fast. The “SSM Supervisory Manual”, for 
example, which covers the processes, procedures, and methodologies for supervision of 
all SSM banks, is far advanced, and is being developed through consultation with NCAs. 
The ECB has reported on the Manual’s coverage of the SSM “Supervisory Review and 
Evaluation Process”, which is required of all bank supervisors and so of the ECB under 
the CRD IV/CRR, including with respect to risk assessment and bank capital and 
liquidity quantification.
162
 The ECB has also engaged in extensive euro-area banking 
system mapping and data collection exercises, constructed a supervisory data reporting 
framework, and has developed a public guide to its supervisory practices, designed to 
provide banks with transparency on the supervision process.
163
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 Above all, perhaps, the 2013-2014 Comprehensive Assessment, the first major 
test of the ECB’s credibility, indicates significant ECB operational capacity (see also 
section 4.2.2 below on the Assessment).
164
 The Comprehensive Assessment was based on 
a detailed stress test and asset quality review
165
 of 131 euro-area banks and banking 
groups (representing some 85% of euro-area banking assets), most of which came under 
direct ECB supervision on 4 November 2014.
166
 Required by the 2013 ECB/SSM 
Regulation (Art. 33(4)), it was conducted in preparation for the ECB assuming its 
supervisory tasks, and was designed to enhance the quality of information on the banks 
assessed, identify problems and the necessary corrective action, and assure stakeholders 
that banks were fundamentally sound and trustworthy.
167
 The Assessment, the results of 
which were announced on 27 October 2014,
168
 led to the ECB disclosing the impact of 
the exercise on banks’ capital positions and to banks being required to take, where 
necessary, remedial action such as the raising of additional capital. Its scale, complexity, 
and costs were well documented across 2014.
169
 It remains to be seen whether the 
Comprehensive Assessment will ultimately be regarded as a credible assessment of the 
strength of the euro area’s major banks. Concerns were expressed in advance as to, for 
example, the dangers of the ECB being incentivized not to be sufficiently rigorous, given 
the current absence of a credible fiscal backstop to take the weight of required remedial 
supervisory remedial measures.
170
 Very preliminary initial reaction suggests that the ECB 
has succeeded in producing a transparent, objective, and robust review.
171
 But at the least, 
the deep review which the Assessment required of banks’ balance sheets and capital 
positions, and the operational readiness which it required of the ECB,
172
 suggest that, on 
a purely operational level, the ECB has risen to this early challenge. 
More generally, the SSM has built in “flexibility buffers” which provide some 
mitigation against the risk of an over-mighty and distanced ECB, at risk of making sub-
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 optimal supervisory decisions for local markets. The significant/less significant allocation 
mechanism ensures direct NCA oversight to some extent at least, and the Article 5 macro-
prudential regime provides for untrammelled NCA intervention with respect to capital 
buffers (subject to more intensive action by the ECB). 
Much remains to be tested, however, including, significantly, the operational 
modalities of how the harmonized banking regulatory regime is to be applied by the 
ECB, particularly in relation to significant banks. How, for example, should the ECB 
proceed where the relevant national rules implementing EU banking rules (which it must 
apply where the harmonized rules take the form of a directive: Art. 4(3), 2013 SSM/ECB 
Regulation) “gold-plate” the EU regime or where the correct interpretation is not clear? 
Which court (ECJ or national) has jurisdiction to rule on a contested ECB 
application/interpretation of a relevant national law?
173
 
 
4.1.3. Governance risks 
Finally among the operational risks, SSM and SRB governance might be regarded as sub-
optimal. 
In the case of the SSM, Treaty exigencies relating to the euro-area Governing 
Council as the primary ECB decision-maker (Art. 129 TFEU) have required that the ECB 
Supervisory Board can only propose decisions which must ultimately be adopted by the 
Governing Council - albeit that a default silent assent procedure applies, the Council’s 
ability to object is time-limited, and Mediation Panel intervention may be requested by 
NCAs (Arts. 26(8) and 25(5), 2013 ECB/SSM Regulation). Albeit in a different 
institutional context, the ESA experience with Commission “endorsement” of ESA-
proposed Binding Technical Standards might be regarded as somewhat bruising, and 
ESA/Commission relations can appear fragile with implications for rule-making 
efficiency.
174
 So far, however, at this very early stage, the Governing Council does not 
seem to be obstructing ECB effectiveness. The major SSM governance structures (SSM 
Chair and Vice Chair, Supervisory Board, and executive Steering Committee) seem to 
have been established with relative ease, and internal procedural rules addressing 
Governing Council and Supervisory Board relations have been adopted.
175
 As at July 
2014, a range of decisions had been adopted by the Governing Council under the “silent” 
non-objection procedure, including more than 100 decisions relating to the “significance” 
assessment, and no decision had been subject to objection.
176
 Similarly, the inevitably 
large size of the ECB Supervisory Board, composed of 18 euro-area NCAs and six others 
(Chair, Vice Chair, and four ECB representatives) does not seem to be generating 
inefficiencies. 
SRB governance, by contrast, remains to be tested. The cumbersome decision-
making process (see section 3.2 above) reflects a compromise between the concern of 
Germany, initially, and subsequently the Council to secure intergovernmental control 
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 through Council engagement, and the European Parliament’s concern to strengthen the 
SRB’s supranational dimension and to protect it from national interests.177 SRB 
governance is undoubtedly awkward, does not cleanly allocate power across 
supranational and intergovernmental interests, and there is some risk of it being 
obstructed by national interests. But while undeniably complex, and while the 
involvement of the Commission and Council sits uneasily with the need to protect the 
SRB’s independence and technical capacity, as well as with the need for speedy and 
objective decision-making, it responds to the acute institutional and national interests 
engaged. 
 
4.2. Treaty and internal market risks 
 
4.2.1. Treaty risks 
4.2.1.1. Competence risks 
BU has re-ordered the balance of power between the Member States and the EU with 
respect to operational banking market governance and in so doing has placed some stress 
on the foundational Treaty settlement regarding the competence of the EU, particularly 
with respect to institution-building. 
EU financial system regulation has long been vulnerable to competence 
challenges by the Member States. The incentives for challenge have not been 
insignificant. Politically, there have long been persistent differences across the Member 
States concerning the appropriate intensity of EU intervention in the financial system 
(reflecting, inter alia, deep-rooted institutional differences in market structure
178
). 
Legally, there has been doubt as to the point on the spectrum at which harmonizing 
measures, usually based on the Treaty internal market competences (typically Arts. 53(1) 
and 114 TFEU), tip from valid concern with market construction to illegal concern with 
market regulation. The Court has repeatedly ruled that the Article 114 TFEU competence, 
which supports much of EU financial system regulation, does not confer a general 
competence to regulate the internal market, but requires that a measure must genuinely 
improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market, and 
that a mere finding of disparities between national rules and the abstract risk of 
infringements to fundamental freedoms or distortions to competition is not sufficient.
179
 
This competence control – certainly prior to the financial crisis which reset assumptions 
as to the depth of the harmonization necessary to protect the internal market - posed some 
constitutional conundrums given the scale and depth of the harmonized regime and the 
steady removal of Member State regulatory discretion. It was not always clear that the 
grounds for EU intervention were solid – particular in market segments where 
harmonized regulation was unlikely to have transformative effects on market behaviour. 
But an elastic interpretation by the ECJ of restrictions imposed by Article 114 TFEU
180
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 limited the extent to which Article 114 confined EU legislative competence in practice.
181
 
Accordingly, and given a broadly facilitative political and institutional status quo, in the 
pre-crisis period only one (banking) measure was challenged, and then unsuccessfully.
182
 
Prior to the financial crisis, the Court had not therefore played a major role in 
policing the limits of EU competence over the financial system. The toxic pathologies of 
the internal financial market which the crisis exposed made the Treaty-required link to 
supporting the internal market a relatively easy one to establish given the need for 
remedial regulatory action. But as the crisis deepened and as rifts opened between the 
Member States as to the nature of EU financial system institutional governance and as to 
the optimal depth and intensity of remedial harmonization, tensions increased and 
litigation has followed. Challenges to the validity of the powers of the European 
Securities and Markets Authority,
183
 to the validity of the CRD IV executive pay regime 
and EBA’s related powers,184 and to the validity of the proposed (2013) Financial 
Transaction Tax being adopted among a group of Member States under the Treaty 
“enhanced cooperation” mechanism,185 for example, together represent an unprecedented 
challenge to the EU’s ability to shape financial system governance in response to crisis. 
The foundational constitutional settlement has also come under pressure with respect to 
economic governance more generally as the Pringle ruling on the validity of the ESM 
Treaty
186
 and the recent preliminary reference from the German Constitutional Court on 
the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions programme suggest.187 The most 
constitutionally novel elements of BU, the SSM and the SRM, have yet to prompt 
litigation, reflecting perhaps their mandatory application to euro-area Member States 
only, which States have strong incentives to ensure a secure basis for the SSM and SRM. 
Nonetheless, the operational quality of the SSM and SRM represents a significant 
extension of the traditional notion of “harmonization” and thus generates the risk of some 
constitutional instability. 
Particular difficulties have arisen in relation to the resilience of Article 114 TFEU 
as a competence for institution building, and particularly for agency construction. Most 
EU agencies have been established under Article 352 TFEU, under which Member States 
have veto powers. Article 114, however, became the workhorse of the EU’s crisis-era 
institutional reforms, supporting the ESAs initially and the SRB subsequently. In the teeth 
of the financial crisis, Article 114, which requires a Council qualified majority vote, was 
a significantly more attractive competence than Article 352. But while Article 114 has 
long been regarded as an accommodating competence, its deployment to support the 
ESAs, which came to be regarded as representing a new form of EU agency given the 
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 extent of their powers,
188
 carried some Treaty risks. The Court in its 2006 ENISA ruling 
provided that ex Article 95 EC (the precursor to Art. 114 TFEU) conferred discretion on 
the EU legislature as to the method of approximation which was appropriate, particularly 
in fields with complex technical features. The legislature could accordingly deem it 
necessary to provide for the establishment of a body (ENISA – the European Network 
and Information Security Agency) which was responsible for contributing to the 
implementation of a “process of harmonization” in situations where the adoption of non-
binding supporting and framework measures was appropriate.
189
 But the ESAs’ 
operational powers are of a different order to ENISA’s co-ordination and information-
gathering powers, and include the power to impose binding decisions on NCAs and 
market participants. Similarly, while SRB resolution plan decisions are ultimately 
endorsed by the Commission, the SRB can exercise a range of potentially intrusive 
powers, including with respect to the instructing of NRAs (Art. 28, 2014 SRM 
Regulation) and the ordering of institutions subject to a resolution plan to take particular 
actions, failing action by the NRA (Art. 29); ultimately, the SRB is granted a “centralized 
power of resolution” (recital 11). Accordingly, and although the financial crisis sharply 
exposed the dependence of EU financial system stability on operational measures beyond 
rule harmonization, the extent to which the governance reforms wrought by the ESAs and 
the SRB were constitutionally resilient was in doubt until the January 2014 Short Selling 
ruling.
190
 While the UK in this litigation did not challenge Article 114 as the basis for the 
European Securities and Markets Authority, it challenged its validity as the competence 
for the Authority’s supervisory powers in relation to short selling under the 2012 Short 
Selling Regulation,
191
 which include the power to direct market participants to take 
particular action and so to over-ride NCAs. But the threat which the challenge posed to 
the validity of agency governance as a means of addressing the crisis led to close political 
interest, and to interventions by Spain, France, and Italy against the UK position. 
In what came to be regarded as an existential threat to a range of ESA powers and 
to the SRB then under negotiation, the Advocate General argued that the European 
Securities and Markets Authority’s short selling powers could not be considered a 
measure for the approximation of Member States’ laws, as required by Article 114. Its 
powers allowed it to intervene in the conditions of competition in a financial market, 
otherwise the remit of an NCA, albeit in defined and exceptional circumstances, and did 
not involve the development of specific and detailed rules relating to financial products 
or services. The powers engaged bore little resemblance to the agency powers which the 
Court had previously found to be Article 114-compliant under the ENISA ruling, being 
legally binding, “lifting implementation powers” from NCAs to the Authority where 
disagreement arose,
192
 and creating an “EU level emergency decision-making 
mechanism”,193 the outcome of which was the replacement of national decision-making. 
Such powers could be conferred under Article 352, given the need for action at EU level 
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 in the circumstances addressed by the short selling powers, although the Advocate 
General acknowledged the political difficulties posed by the unanimous Council vote 
required. The Court, however, reflecting its earlier case law, adopted a liberal approach to 
Article 114 which acknowledged the financial stability context and the Authority’s 
technical expertise. It found, building on the ENISA ruling, that the EU legislature could 
delegate to an agency powers for the implementation of the harmonization sought, 
particularly where the measures to be adopted were dependent on specific professional 
and technical expertise and on speedy reaction. Nothing in Article 114 implied that the 
addressees of related measures could only be the Member States. The “measures for 
approximation” supported by Article 114 could go beyond the approximation of laws 
where it was necessary to ensure the unity of the market. With respect to the Article 114 
requirement that the measure have as its object the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market, the Court did not engage in extensive analysis. It drew on the recitals to 
the 2012 Short Selling Regulation in finding that the purpose of the Regulation was to 
ensure the proper functioning of the internal financial market by means of the adoption of 
a common regulatory framework to address short selling and to ensure greater co-
ordination and consistency where measures must be taken in exceptional circumstances. 
 The Court’s ruling is carefully framed by the particular qualities of the Authority’s 
powers under the 2012 Short Selling Regulation. But a liberal reading might suggest that 
it has significantly stabilized the constitutional basis of EBA and of the SRB by 
accommodating within Article 114 supervisory powers for agencies which over-ride NCA 
powers, and by highlighting the particular role of expert technocratic governance in 
supporting the single financial market.
194
 This is all the more the case as the Court, over 
time and albeit across a limited jurisprudence, has almost always favoured the EU interest 
in financial market construction over national interests in protecting distinctive market 
features.
195
 The Short Selling ruling suggests that the shift in characterization over the 
crisis from harmonization as rule-making to harmonization as institution-building has not 
led to a change in the Court’s approach. 
The SRM/SRB, however, brought additional Article 114 difficulties. The SRM is 
aligned with the SSM and designed in particular to support the euro area, the Member 
States of which must participate in the SRM. Can reliance on Article 114, an internal-
market-orientated competence, be justified? Formally, the SRM is not restricted to euro-
area Member States. With respect to establishing the link to the support of the internal 
market, it is axiomatic that the health of the internal market is dependent on the health of 
euro area. The SRM is a key component of BU, and an essential complement to the SSM, 
and so a necessary if not sufficient condition for the euro area to function efficiently. 
More generally, the financial crisis has starkly illustrated how aggressively banking 
market damage and risk can be transmitted across the internal market. Containment of 
risk in one part of the internal market through the SRM should mitigate the extent to 
which risk spreads in crisis conditions; this all the more given that nine of world’s 29 
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 Global Systemically Important Banks
196
 will be supervised by the ECB and subject to the 
SRM. Similarly, the SRM, by facilitating euro-area resolution through common decision-
making, and supporting the SSM’s ability to strengthen euro-area bank supervision, 
should have wider confidence-boosting effects for the internal banking market more 
generally and also bring supervisory economies of scale to EU banking groups operating 
within and outside the euro area.
197
 
But an additional SRM difficulty arose, related to Germany’s concern that Article 
114 did not support the imposition of an obligation on Member States to mutualize 
resolution funds. Despite significant political and institutional support for Article 114, the 
Intergovernmental Agreement device was deployed to take a number of issues related to 
the Single Resolution Fund outside the SRM Regulation and so Article 114, even though 
such an action involved the Member States acting outside the Treaty in an area of shared 
competence and which directly affected the SRM. European Parliament hostility was 
fierce
198
 given its exclusion thereby from key negotiations and prejudice to the 
“Community method”.199 It argued that Article 114 was an appropriate legal base; that the 
principles of sincere cooperation (Art. 4(3) TEU), institutional balance, and democracy 
all required that the ordinary legislative procedure not be circumvented by an 
Intergovernmental Agreement; that matters within an EU competence and referring to the 
ordinary legislative procedure could not be regulated by an international agreement once 
the Commission presented a proposal; that the Agreement regulated an essential element 
of the Fund; and that the Agreement circumvented Article 291 TFEU which empowered 
the Commission, not the Member States, to determine the uniform conditions for the 
implementation of a binding act.
200
 While the Parliament regarded its subsequent 
participation in the Agreement’s intergovernmental conference as not waiving its 
prerogatives to reject the exclusion of any element in the parallel SRM Regulation 
negotiations, its concerns were somewhat allayed by the Council’s invitation to 
participate in the negotiations. The Intergovernmental Agreement fracas accordingly 
highlights the institutional pragmatism which attended the construction of BU but also 
the longstanding vulnerability of Article 114 to being deployed to achieve political ends. 
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  The SSM proved somewhat less constitutionally troublesome. The ECB’s 
competence to engage in specific operational prudential supervision tasks is relatively 
secure under Article 127(6) TFEU.
201
 Technically, this competence might have also 
sustained ECB supervision of “financial institutions” other than insurance companies 
(e.g. investment firms and systemically significant actors such as central clearing 
counterparties), and so supported the holistic, cross-sectoral, functional approach to 
supervision which the crisis exposed as being necessary. But the vast population of 
different types of non-bank financial institutions, their weaker connection to the euro-area 
crisis, and the political and regulatory design difficulties which their inclusion would 
have entailed (not least with respect to subsequent resolution) meant that their exclusion 
was always a practical reality. The Treaty rules governing the ECB did, however, present 
some challenges to the institutional design of the SSM, notably the Treaty requirement 
that the euro-area ECB Governing Council be the ultimate decision-maker (Art. 129 
TFEU) and the related difficulties, including with respect to the representational risks 
faced by non-euro-area participating Member States.
202
 In order to address this problem, 
a procedure is available which allows such Member States not to follow a Governing 
Council decision (Art. 26(8)), 2013 ECB/SSM Regulation) although such an action may 
lead to the suspension or removal of the Member State from the SSM close-cooperation 
arrangement (Art. 7(7)). These Member States are also empowered to notify the 
Governing Council of their disagreement with a draft Supervisory Board decision, 
following which the Governing Council is to explain its decision to the Member State 
concerned (that State may subsequently request termination of close cooperation (Art. 
7(8)). 
 
4.2.1.2. The Meroni doctrine 
Treaty difficulties have also taken the form of risks under the Meroni doctrine which 
troubled the establishment of the SRB, although in the wake of the 2014 Short Selling 
ruling they can be regarded as having abated somewhat. Agencies must operate within the 
requirements of the seminal 1958 Meroni ruling which provides, inter alia, that 
discretionary powers involving a wide margin of discretion cannot be delegated by an EU 
institution.
203
 Only clearly defined executive powers, subject to strict review in light of 
objective criteria determined by the delegating authority, may be delegated. But 
operational supervision and resolution can (and typically does) involve discretionary 
decisions as to how rules are applied. The need to exercise a degree of discretion or 
judgment in making an operational decision does not, in itself, risk a Meroni breach, as 
long as the conditions under which the discretion is exercised are clear and a wide margin 
of discretion is not afforded. But multiple difficulties of nuance can arise, despite the 
acute need for a legally secure operating environment. Difficulties can arise, for example, 
                                                 
201
 Which provides that the Council can confer specific tasks upon the ECB concerning policies relating to 
the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of 
insurance undertakings. Nonetheless, the validity of the competence prompted some discussion, including 
on whether the scale of the ECB’s powers risked a breach of the “specific” criteria. 
202
 Sweden in particular sought a Treaty revision; this was rejected by a number of Member States given the 
difficulties of ratification: Barker, “Time to decide on Bank Union”, Financial Times, 25 Nov. 2012, p. 6. 
203
 On Meroni and operational/supervisory governance generally see e.g. Curtin, “Delegation to EU non-
majoritarian agencies and emerging practices of public accountability”, in Geradin, Muňoz and Petit (Eds.), 
Regulation through Agencies in the EU. A New Paradigm of European Governance? (Elgar, 2005), p. 87. 
 in relation to how much discretion along a spectrum is valid and whether the margin of 
discretion is overly wide where policy choices are, to some extent, engaged. A Meroni 
breach might arise where the operating environment is uncertain or unstable or where 
sensitive choices are required. Difficulties can arise with respect to the degree of 
conditionality imposed; strict conditionality may fetter an agency’s operational 
effectiveness and independence, but a loose regime, designed to support judgment-based 
action, may risk a Meroni breach.
204
 
From the outset, accordingly, there were concerns that the granting of executive 
resolution powers to the SRB could breach Meroni. Meroni compliance can also, 
however, become a proxy for Member State and institutional concern to curtail 
supranational governance. The European Parliament was therefore concerned to ensure 
that Meroni arguments not be used to increase the influence of NRAs and to reduce the 
powers of the SRB. In principle, the SRB is vulnerable to breaching the Meroni 
conditions given its powers to place an institution in resolution, its powers to construct a 
resolution scheme, and its subsequent operational powers. The “Meroni-proofing” of the 
SRB is achieved in particular by the Commission’s endorsement powers and its ability to 
object to discretionary elements of an SRB resolution plan, as well as the extensive 
conditionality - reflecting the 2014 Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) 
resolution regime - which applies to the SRB’s executive powers, including to instruct 
banks in resolution. The Short Selling ruling suggests that within this framework the SRB 
is likely to be Meroni compliant.
205
 Rejecting the UK challenge that the powers of the 
European Securities and Markets Authority engaged discretionary powers which did not 
comply with Meroni, the ECJ found that the degree of conditionality imposed on the 
powers (including under the related administrative rules) meant that the Meroni 
requirements were satisfied. The Court also emphasized the importance of the Authority’s 
technical expertise to EU financial market governance. 
Some degree of certainty has now been achieved.
206
 But the Court did not, by 
contrast with the Advocate General, take the opportunity to reconsider Meroni in light of 
the “agencification” of EU governance generally since the Meroni ruling and recent 
constitutional developments, including the clarification by the Lisbon Treaty of the nature 
of delegated and implementing acts and the application of judicial review to EU agencies, 
or in light of the particular needs of EU financial system governance. Neither did it 
consider – also by contrast with the Advocate General - whether the powers in questions 
were conferred (in which case Meroni does not apply) or delegated. Accordingly, the 
extent to which discretion has been confined in a particular case remains the touchstone 
for the legality of agencies’ operational powers, the spectrum of permitted operational 
discretion remains somewhat fuzzy, and the Meroni conditionality fetters on agency 
operation remain attached. The tension between the SRB, as the independent, expert 
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 competent agency, and the Commission, as the constitutional location of executive 
decision-making power but also of potentially conflicting functions (including with 
respect to the approval of any state aid to be provided to an institution in resolution), also 
persists, and signals a degree of instability at the heart of the SRM. 
 
4.2.2. Internal market risks 
 
4.2.2.1. Ins and outs 
Significant risks also arise as to the internal market/euro-area disconnect at the core of 
BU. 
The construction, regulation, supervision, and support of the internal financial 
market has been the driving concern of EU financial governance from the outset, albeit 
that the crisis saw this concern become re-characterized as a concern to protect the 
stability of the market from the pathologies inherent in cross-border risk transmission. 
But, and although BU is associated with stronger internal market integration,
207
 the 
advent of BU marks the first time EU financial system governance has become 
fragmented between, primarily, the euro area and non-euro-area. Another example may 
soon follow given the efforts to construct a Financial Transaction Tax “zone” for those 
Member States in support of such a tax under the Treaty’s closer cooperation provisions, 
but this venture has yet to complete. Although the very early discussions on BU regarded 
it as an internal market construct,
208
 it rapidly became tied to the euro area and to access 
to the ESM, although a device for non-euro-area Member States to participate voluntarily 
was envisaged at an early stage. But a related concern to protect the governance of the 
internal market financial system became associated with BU from the outset. The 
Commission’s September 2012 BU roadmap, for example, is notable for the extent to 
which it highlights the need to protect the integrity of the internal market and the single 
banking rule-book and the extent to which the internal market and BU are “mutually 
reinforcing” processes.209 
In practice, as the SSM and SRM are open to non-euro-area Member States 
through the "close cooperation" mechanism (which applies to entry to the SSM – SSM 
entry then requires participation in the SRM), the disjunction between BU and the 
internal market relates to fragmentation between participating Member States and non-
participating Member States. But until the close cooperation mechanism acquires some 
momentum, BU can primarily be regarded in terms of the euro area. Non-euro-area 
Member States which enter into a close cooperation arrangement subject their banks to 
the SSM regime and must ensure that their NCAs abide by any guidelines or requests 
issued by the ECB and follow instructions issued by the ECB (Art. 7(1), (2) and (4), 2013 
ECB/SSM Regulation).
210
 ECB supervisory governance is adjusted to reflect the 
exclusion of close cooperation Member States from the Governing Council (they are 
represented on the Supervisory Board) by means of an objection device which applies to 
Governing Council decisions and also draft Supervisory Board decisions, as noted in 
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 section 4.2.1 above (Art. 7(7) and (8)). The ECB retains the power to suspend or 
terminate a close cooperation arrangement where NCAs do not comply with Article 7 
(and where the Governing Council objection procedure is activated), while the “close 
cooperation” participating Member States also have the right to request termination (Art. 
7(5)-(7)). 
It remains to be seen whether non-euro-area Member States, and particularly the 
euro “pre-ins”, have sufficiently strong incentives to join the SSM and SRM early - 
which would dilute fragmentation risks and build momentum behind BU.
211
 Supervisory 
efficiencies, reputational benefits, and economies of scale advantages may follow, 
particularly for the smaller and newer EU Member States, and not least given the 
dominance in such markets of euro-area headquartered banking groups. NCAs of such 
Member States would retain the powers enjoyed by SSM NCAs generally, including with 
respect to macro-prudential buffers. The ECB is also charged with having full regard to 
the different types, business models and sizes of bank, and with having full regard to the 
unity and integrity of internal market (Art. 1, 2013 ECB/SSM Regulation). Nonetheless, 
the loss of sovereignty would be real and exacerbated by the lack of representation on the 
ECB Governing Council. It would also be exacerbated by the absence of a direct fiscal 
incentive, although SSM participation may lead to indirect fiscal support where SSM 
supervision removes any risk of a discounting of sovereign debt relating to perceived 
weaknesses in national supervision. Access to the ESM, a driving influence for the 
construction of BU, is only open to euro-area Member States, and the proposed fiscal 
backstop to the SRM has yet to be constructed. 
To date, only Bulgaria and Romania, both of which have experienced major 
supervisory crises and financial system failures, are reported to be in discussions with the 
ECB on close cooperation.
212
 Whether or not the SSM will attract Member States whose 
banking systems are not in crisis will be revealing as to the extent of the efficiencies and 
market integration synergies the SSM can bring, and of the institutional protections for 
“close cooperation” Member States. 
 
4.2.2.2. EBA and the internal market interest 
While the disjunction between BU and the internal market generates a number of risks,
213
 
the most significant pressure point concerns the relationship between the ECB and 
EBA.
214
 EBA, an internal market actor and part of the ESFS, is charged with, inter alia, 
supporting the application and implementation of the harmonized EU banking regime by 
means of a range of functions, including the adoption of guidance, stress testing, peer 
review, binding mediation, breach of EU law action, and action in emergency situations. 
The dangers that the BU-constructed coalition of participating Member States and NCAs 
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 and the construction of a powerful ECB supervisor pose to EBA’s effectiveness - and 
accordingly to the internal market interest in banking market governance - were a feature 
of BU discussions from the outset.
215
 Stakeholder concern to protect EBA’s role was 
significant throughout the BU construction process.
216
 Most recently, the Commission’s 
August 2014 review of the ESAs and the ESFS has noted the potential impact of BU on 
the ESFS, underlined the importance of the ESAs in supporting the harmonized EU 
regulatory regime, and committed the Commission to close monitoring of the interaction 
between BU and the ESFS, including EBA.
217
 The European Parliament has also been 
concerned to shore up the powers of the ESAs within the SSM and in relation to the 
ECB.
218
 
 A series of mechanisms have been deployed to support EBA by the SSM-driven 
2013 enhancements to the 2010 EBA Regulation. Chief among them are the governance 
reforms to EBA decision-making.
219
 These include new procedures designed to protect 
non-participating NCAs from being outvoted by a participating NCA majority on the 
EBA Board of Supervisors through a double-majority (“double-lock”) voting system: 
separate simple majorities within the participating and non-participating blocs are 
required for the purposes of reaching the qualified majority required for Board of 
Supervisors’ quasi-rule-making activities (Art. 44, 2010 EBA Regulation). They also 
include special governance arrangements, involving the use of NCA panels which operate 
under the double-lock procedure, for highly sensitive EBA decisions (breach of EU law 
and binding mediation actions) (Arts. 41 and 44). The internal market interest is also 
supported by the requirement for an EBA-developed “Single Supervisory Handbook”220 
which “sets out supervisory best practices for methodologies and processes” for the EU 
as a whole (Arts. 8 and 29(2)) and which applies to the ECB. In a related provision, EBA 
has been given a new power to promote pan-EU convergence of the Supervisory Review 
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 and Evaluation Process required of NCAs (and of the ECB) under the CRD IV/CRR (Art. 
20a) and thus to promote internal-market-wide convergence between ECB practices and 
those of non-participating NCAs. 
In addition, the ECB has been brought within the ESFS and made subject to 
EBA’s powers, including its enforcement powers in relation to breach of EU law, binding 
mediation, and emergency conditions (Art. 2(2)(f)), 2010 EBA Regulation). This presents 
something of a constitutional conundrum in terms of the institutional balance set up under 
the Treaties in that it subjects the ECB, a Treaty institution, to EBA, an agency set up 
under secondary law. Difficulties also arise in relation to the ECB’s independence 
guarantee.
221
 It is, however, hard to see how else the institutional relationship could have 
been managed, at least without unravelling EBA’s powers in order to maintain the ECB’s 
hierarchical position. While weakening EU banking market governance, any such 
unravelling of EBA’s powers would have prejudiced EU financial system governance 
generally, as the parallel powers of the other ESAs would necessarily have been removed 
also. Alternatively, exempting the ECB from EBA’s powers to ensure pan-EU consistency 
in the application of EU banking regulation would have deepened the asymmetry risk 
posed by the SSM’s variable integration, created potentially troublesome situations where 
an NCA but not the ECB became subject to an EBA decision, and generated destabilizing 
conflicts between the ECB and EBA. But the consequent institutional balance conundrum 
is all the more complex as the ECB does not have voting powers on EBA. A non-voting 
representative of the Supervisory Board sits on the EBA Board of Supervisors (Art. 
40(1), 2010 EBA Regulation). Concerns as to over-weighty SSM/ECB influence have 
trumped the reasonable assumption that all supervisors subject to EBA guidance and 
other actions be represented on the Board. The ECB is, however, to contribute to the 
development of technical standards by EBA and may draw EBA’s attention to any 
potential revisions needed to delegated rules (Art. 4(3), 2013 ECB/SSM Regulation). 
The internal market interest is also supported by the definition of the EU banking 
rules which the ECB must follow as including EBA guidelines, in relation to which the 
ECB must “comply or explain” (Art. 4(3), 2013 ECB/SSM Regulation and Art.16, 2010 
EBA Regulation). More generally, the ECB is to cooperate with EBA - and with the other 
ESAs and the European Systemic Risk Board (Art. 3(1), 2013 ECB/SSM Regulation) and 
to carry out its tasks without prejudice to the competence and tasks of EBA (and those of 
the other ESAs and the European Systemic Risk Board). Albeit somewhat otiosely given 
the Treaty non-discrimination principle, the ECB is also charged with not discriminating 
against any Member State or group of Member States as a venue for the provision of 
banking services, while it is to carry out its duties with full regard and duty of care for the 
unity and integrity of the internal market (Art. 1, 2013 ECB/SSM Regulation). 
 Whether or not EBA has a sufficiently enhanced capacity to protect the internal 
market interest remains to be seen. Some signs augur well. The 2013-2014 
Comprehensive Assessment had significant potential to generate de-stabilizing tension 
between the ECB and EBA given the split of jurisdiction between EBA and the ECB with 
respect to the politically-sensitive stress testing function. EBA, following the 2013 
revisions, is charged with considering, at least annually, whether it is appropriate to 
consider EU-wide stress tests and with disclosing the results (Art. 22, 2010 EBA 
Regulation). It is also, for the purposes of running stress tests, empowered to request 
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 related information directly from financial institutions and to request NCAs to conduct 
specific reviews and onsite inspections (Art. 32(3a)). The ECB, however, is also 
empowered to conduct stress tests, albeit in cooperation with EBA (Art. 4(1)(f), 2013 
ECB/SSM Regulation). 
The ECB’s 2013-2014 Comprehensive Assessment accordingly represented the 
first serious test of EBA/ECB relations. EBA had strong incentives to exert control over 
the stress test element of the Assessment, to protect its institutional position but also to 
extinguish the reputational damage which it sustained after the 2011 stress test, the initial 
robustness of which came to be regarded as having been subsequently diluted through 
politicization.
222
 The ECB had similarly strong incentives to establish its executive 
capacity, signal its ability to run a rigorous and transparent process, and to ensure that the 
exercise would allow it to commence supervision in a strong position. The allocation of 
stress-testing functions, however, appears to have been relatively efficient. In particular, 
EBA set the common methodology and scenarios for the 2014 pan-EU stress test, which 
also applied to non-euro-area banks and was run by the relevant NCAs
223
 but which, for 
euro-area banks, formed a subset of the ECB’s Comprehensive Assessment.224 The ECB’s 
Comprehensive Assessment process thus folded in the EBA stress test methodology, 
while the ECB’s related review of banks’ balance sheets under the asset quality review 
was based on an EBA Recommendation.
225
 There is accordingly some heartening 
evidence that the Comprehensive Assessment, while clearly an ECB project, can in some 
respects be regarded as an executive application of pan-EU standards and methodologies. 
EBA additionally acknowledged the role of the ECB in communicating any assessment 
sensitivities which were additional to the standard EU-wide stress testing scenario and 
with respect to consequent supervisory action relating to, for example, capital-raising.
226
 
There is also considerable evidence of ongoing EBA/ECB cooperation over the 
Comprehensive Assessment.
227
 
Other signs are less promising. There is, for example, potential for the ECB, 
already empowered to adopt rules relating to the SSM (Art. 4(3), 2013 ECB/SSM 
Regulation), to become a competing standard-setter, particularly as its softer 
“instructions” and “guidelines” are likely to attain a quasi-regulatory colour. Although the 
ECB is charged in this regard with following EBA guidelines and the EBA Supervisory 
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 Handbook,
228
 and can only adopt rules with respect to the organizational and operational 
modalities of banking supervision within the SSM (Art. 4(3)), the potential, at least, for 
some conflict is there, though this would diminish as the institutional landscape settles. 
While the 2013-2014 Comprehensive Assessment appears to have gone well, the 
EBA/ECB communication channels are not as strong as they might be. While the ECB is 
a non-voting member of the EBA Board of Supervisors, EBA is not a permanent observer 
on the ECB Supervisory Board. By contrast, a Commission representative may 
participate as an observer on the Supervisory Board and the SRM Chairperson may be 
invited (Art. 26(11), 2013 ECB/SSM Regulation and Art. 30, 2014 SRM Regulation). 
The SSM rules of procedure allow EBA to be invited, but, dependent on delegated rules, 
its engagement appears less secure. 
More fundamental difficulties arise. EBA’s ability to protect the internal market 
interest may be hampered by the limitations inherent in its agency status. To take one 
example, and leaving to one side the institutional balance problem noted above, the 
extent to which EBA can impose decisions on NCAs and the ECB through binding 
mediation, and thereby enhance its ability to support consistent supervision more 
generally, is not clear given Meroni doctrine restrictions. In particular, there is uncertainty 
as to the extent to which EBA can impose a decision on an NCA where a divergence of 
opinion arises between NCAs, but an NCA claims it is lawfully exercising discretion - 
particularly as recital 32 of the 2010 EBA regulation seems to protect the ability of NCAs 
to lawfully exercise discretion.
229
 Recital 32 has recently been reflected in Article 95 of 
the 2014 SRM Regulation, which provides that NRAs become subject to EBA’s binding 
mediation powers, but not where NRAs exercise discretionary powers or make policy 
choices. But with this limitation, the binding mediation power risks becoming a “dead 
letter” if it cannot be deployed where divergent and obstructive differences of opinion 
emerge between NCAs (and between NCAs and the ECB). Overall, the persistence of 
discretion as a touchstone for legitimate EBA action (section 4.2.1 above) poses a 
challenge to EBA effectiveness. More generally, the EBA governance model, which is 
based on an intergovernmental mode of decision-making by NCAs on the Board of 
Supervisors, may hinder its ability to develop distinct “EU” positions, particularly in 
more sensitive areas.
230
 
It is not entirely clear that the Commission’s August 2014 ESFS Review will 
significantly strengthen EBA. The Commission has, for example, committed to reviewing 
the conditions under which the binding mediation power may be exercised and how ESA 
Board of Supervisor governance can be strengthened such that the EU interest comes to 
prevail, and called for the ESAs generally to focus more closely on supervisory 
convergence.
231
 The proposed potential extensions of the ESAs’ roles, including with 
respect to shadow banking and consumer protection, may lead to a widening of EBA’s 
mandate and thereby to an enhancements of its credibility and influence more generally. 
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 At this point, whether or not the risk of BU-driven prejudice to internal market 
banking system governance will crystallize is a matter of speculation. In some respects, 
the problem is a transitional one – it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the position of 
the “euro outs” will be precarious as the current group of “pre-ins” join the euro and 
BU,
232
 and as euro area and internal market governance interests become more closely 
aligned. But much remains uncertain, including the position of the UK. EU financial rules 
and institutional governance requirements are a particular pressure point in the current 
somewhat fraught relationship between the UK and the EU, given perceptions of their 
asymmetric impact on the UK’s wholesale financial market, as the recent swathe of UK-
initiated challenges before the ECJ underlines.
233
 But as a strong advocate for the 
protection of the internal market, the UK is likely to be at the forefront of efforts to 
ensure that internal market banking system governance does not become subsumed under 
BU. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Any number of dates could be used to mark the arrival of Banking Union, but the 4 
November 2014 commencement of SSM operations marks a key staging post. Ultimately, 
and at the risk of stretching a common metaphor too far, while BU has had a long and 
complex gestation there are some indications that a sturdy institutional actor in the form 
of the SSM arrived on 4 November 2014. But whether BU more generally will 
experience troubled early years remains to be seen. 
This article suggests that it can be asserted with reasonable confidence that the 
foundational regulatory technology is relatively robust, given the difficult political, 
institutional, and Treaty conditions which attended its construction. There is cause for 
optimism that euro-area bank supervision, in particular, will be strengthened and that 
internal market bank governance more generally will, at least, not be prejudiced. There is 
also evidence of a pragmatic willingness to revisit the structure, including any required 
revisions “at the level of primary law”.234 
But BU is work-in-progress. The SSM co-ordination mechanism remains to be 
tested. Whether or not the SRB can take difficult and neutral resolution decisions in the 
eye of a major banking collapse remains to be seen. The SRM backstop is not yet in 
place. The safest conclusion, perhaps, is that the BU project is underway and can be 
expected to have far-reaching effects on EU banking market governance and, given the 
momentum effects which have long attended EU financial governance, on institutional 
design for the EU financial system generally. 
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